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CONTENTS

1 A Stinking Tradition: Tsuda Sōkichi’s View of China
   Joël Joos

27 Drury’s Occupation of Macau and China’s Response to Early Modern Imperialism
   Frederic Wakeman, Jr.

35 On the Sheng-wu Ch’iin-cheng lu 聖武親征錄
   Igor de Rachewiltz

53 The Press and the Rise of Peking Opera Singers to National Stardom:
   The Case of Theater Illustrated (1912–17)
   Catherine V. Yeh

87 Compliance, Dissent and the Containment of China
   Timothy Kendall
Cover calligraphy  Yan Zhenqing 颜真卿, Tang calligrapher and statesman

Cover illustration  Qian Binghe, “Saочu zhang'ai” [Removing Obstacles], subtitled “New drama of the Republic.” A sweeper in Republican army uniform clears away all that is connected to the Qing dynasty. Theater Illustrated, 18 November 1912

Errata  In the previous issue of East Asian History (No.27) an incorrect character was given on p.57 for Wen-hsin Yeh. The characters should read: 叶文心
A STINKING TRADITION: TSUDA SŌKICHI'S VIEW OF CHINA

Joël Joos

Introduction

Modern Japan’s relationship with China has been complex, to say the least. One might argue that Japan’s modernization was to a considerable extent a ‘de-sinification,’ a dissociation from China in terms not only of intellectual production but also of an entire world view. Yet the process leading to the demise of China’s millennium-old status as a model among Japan’s élites was neither simple nor straightforward, and it was closely intertwined with both China’s and Japan’s ways of dealing with the challenges of the modern world.

Although Meiji modernizers built on the intellectual legacy of ‘National Learning’ Kokugaku (a current of thought that had made strenuous efforts to redefine Japanese identity in explicitly non-Chinese terms as early as the late eighteenth century), late-Edo 江戸 ‘restorationism,’ as well as the first state structures of the ‘modern’ Meiji, drew heavily upon Chinese inspiration.

Yoshida Shōin 吉田松陰 was an ardent reader of Mencius 孟子; the first government structures of Meiji Japan were modeled on those mentioned in the Taihō 太宝 Code of 601; and many mid nineteenth-century Japanese intellectuals first learned about the West through Chinese writings and translations of Western texts. Furthermore, it was only when the sun started to set on the Edo regime—along with its taste for Chinese cultural concepts—that

1 In recent times this term has mainly been used in relation to Taiwan’s status vis-à-vis the mainland. As far as world view or national awareness is concerned, however, use of the /term may not be entirely unwarranted in the Japanese context. K.H. Kim refers to the latter half of the period between Meiji and 1945 as an “age of neglect,” while Marius Jansen observes (regarding ‘cultural’ participation in the Chinese world of the Tokugawa Japanese, which was “partial, and mutually beneficial”) that after the decline of the shogunate “no consciousness of benevolence on the one side and even less sense of obligation on the other” was left. K.H. Kim, Japanese Perspectives on China’s Early Modernization (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1974); and Marius B. Jansen, China in the Tokugawa World (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), p.119
travel to China became possible. This was exactly the moment, however, when Japanese travelers headed for Europe, seeing Chinese (treaty) ports as points of relay rather than as proper destinations—points of relay, nonetheless, where they were able to witness the raw encounter between the West and Asia. It was not clear how all of this would turn out.

During the first decades of Western impact (roughly 1850–1900), Japan's political elite acted in a relatively pragmatic manner as far as China and its legacy were concerned. Ito Hirobumi, for instance, pleaded for the maintenance of China's territorial integrity, and Japan's active role in propagating change in late-Qing China was highly valued by Chinese reformers such as Huang Zunxian and Liang Qichao. Basically, it was only after Japan started pursuing an imperialist policy at the expense of Chinese territorial integrity and sovereignty, and amid ensuing Chinese perceptions of this, that things soured (after 1915 in particular).

China's loss of status as a model did not lead to immediate and total rejection in the scholarly world. Clearly, many intellectuals among the new generation that had been raised with the critique of Confucianism and the Chinese cultural model by 'Enlightenment' thinkers such as Fukuzawa Yukichi and Taguchi Ukichi, and had accustomed themselves to the demands of the newly established educational hierarchy, eschewed the study of the language, history and thought of China in favor of those of European nations. This does not mean, however, that all scholars turned away from China. Some used the methods and insights offered by Western scholarship to study what was no longer an ultimate model, but one that certainly still remained a very sizeable intellectual legacy to be dealt with. These scholars included Naka Michiyo, Tan Sitong, Kang Youwei, and Zhang Zhidong, among others.

At the end of the nineteenth century, Japanese scholarship on China was confronted not only with the complexities of a shared and until recently intertwined 'past,' but also with the outcomes of modernization, both in Japan and in East Asia in general. The successful modernization of Japan's material infrastructure led to an active policy of interference on the Asian mainland at the expense of a wavering China, and its unexpected victory in the war against the Qing armies left Japan (and East Asia) with a mixed legacy: Japan solidified its modern success—and thus strengthened its role as a model for its Asian neighbors—at the expense of these neighbors. At the same time, against the backdrop of this 'material' success, Japan's modern scholarship started to inch out of the shadow of direct government interference, acquiring a critical mass which allowed it to produce and reproduce its own 'agenda.' Japanese sinology was forced to deal with these tendencies, which translated themselves into a mounting complexity in the relationship between the political

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9 See Fogel, Politics and Sinology, pp.5–10.
and scholarly realms, that is between China as a political or military problem and China as a research topic or a cultural concept. These intricate tensions can be found in the thought of a ‘second generation’ of China scholars, who came to the fore at a time (around 1895) when the historical study of China and ‘the East’ was set apart from that of ‘the West’ (and Japan proper) and can be identified with two emerging approaches that would dominate the academic arena for many years to come: sinology (shina-gaku 支那学) and oriental history (tōyō-shi 東洋史).

The sinology of Kyoto-based Naitō Konan 内藤湖南 (1866–1934) related to a lingering Han studies (kangaku 漢学) tradition (that is the study of Chinese classical texts as it emerged out of the Edo period and survived after the Restoration). It took a very committed stance toward China. Fogel demonstrates that, for Naitō Konan, China’s modernization was not a distant affair. The answer to the question as to what role Japan could play in China’s modernization was not to be found in textual analysis and condescending advice alone; it required a far more intense engagement, in which the political realities of contemporary China were taken into account and Japanese government policy was not automatically accepted. By contrast, modern China research at Tokyo Imperial University labeled itself “oriental history.” It was conducted at an uncompromising distance from its topic and from any ‘real-time’ developments (subjects on which scholars hardly ever published). It reflected the ‘objectivist’ approach of Shiratori Kurakichi 白鳥倉吉 (1865–1942), whose analysis of the Chinese classics was scrupulous, but whose contempt for China’s modern chaos was almost proverbial. The correctness of Japanese government policy was generally taken as a given. Stefan Tanaka has argued that the scholarly efforts of people like Shiratori cannot be separated from the realities of Japanese colonialism, pairing as they did a ‘Western’ belief in ‘pure’ method and modern progress with the view that China (or ‘the Orient’ as such) was a voiceless and perpetually repetitive tradition mired in its own shortcomings, and that Shiratori’s oriental history was therefore (intellectual) imperialism.

Tsuda Sōkichi’s interpretations of China—the focus of this article—can be related directly to those of Shiratori, of whom Tsuda (1873–1961) can be considered a close disciple (although the two scholars’ understandings of Japan’s role in Asia do not coincide). Tsuda stood closer to Shiratori as a person than as a scholar. Certainly he owed his first steps as a historian to the patronage of Shiratori (who invited Tsuda to do research on pre-modern Manchurian and Korean history) and his dedication to him remained unquestioned till the day of Shiratori’s death in 1942. Tsuda never studied at Tokyo University, however, nor was he even an academically trained historian. He generally kept his distance from the formalism of ‘official scholarship’ 官学 and at times reached conclusions that were at odds with Shiratori’s views. For instance, Tsuda criticized Shiratori’s method for relying too heavily on given assumptions rather than drawing conclusions directly from the text at hand. As this article will stress, Tsuda particularly disagreed with Shiratori—although

11 See ibid, p.8.
14 On the ‘orientalism’ of Shiratori’s views, see Stefan Tanaka, Japan’s Orient: rendering pasts into history (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1993), especially ch.2.
The two volumes on Korean historical geography are combined in *TSZ*, vol. 11. The original version of Tsuda's myth research is found in *TSZ*, separate vol. 1, a collection of post-war revised versions of some of the chapters included in his original works in *TSZ*, vols. 1, 2 and 3. Tsuda's research on myths was inspired by Shiratori's research on the same subject, and probably by Takagi Toshio's *Hikaku shinwa-gaku* [A Comparative Study of Myths] (Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1904) as well.

This disagreement was never expressed directly—on the significance of the category of 'the Orient,' which he considered ahistorical, unworkable and politically misguided. As Tsuda saw it, Japan and China did not share a common cultural dynamic that set them apart from the West. Although he never explicitly stated that Japan should withdraw from China, his stance could easily be interpreted as an implicit criticism of government policy, something Shiratori would never have dreamt of making.

In a more narrow scholarly sense, Tsuda stepped out of his tutor's shadow in 1913. That was the year in which the result of almost a decade of cooperation with Shiratori, the two-volume *Research on the Historical Geography of Korea* (*Chōsen rekishi chiri kenkyū* 朝鮮歷史地理研究), was published, and also the year in which Tsuda first received credit and attention for his own work, namely a rigorous textual analysis of Japan's mythology as found in the early eighth-century *Record of Ancient Matters* (*Kojiki* 古事記) and *Chronicle of Japan* (*Nihon shoki* 日本書紀). Shortly afterwards he won more renown with his work (from 1916 onwards) on Japan's 'national thought' as seen through literature. Offering a grand overview of no less than ten centuries of literary production, this magnum opus that brought together an unprecedented multitude of sources commanded great respect.

By the time Tsuda published his main works on China, Japan's presence on the mainland was no longer the unexpected outcome of a distant war, but a lasting and increasingly 'total' commitment, with tangible repercussions for Japan: victory over Russia, the annexation of Korea, China's nationalist revolution and its anti-Japanese character, and the winning and loss of concessions in Shandong. Around 1920, Tsuda started shifting his focus toward China, and in the next two decades he would produce enough research on Chinese intellectual traditions to fill about a third of his 33-volume collected works. Again, his thorough textual analysis and avoidance of abstract theorizing established for him a reputation among a limited circle of specialized scholars. He did not, however, respond to any specific events in China, and never let contemporary developments affect his judgment, even in the 1930s when Chinese-Japanese relations took an ominous turn (to put it mildly).

It was in this period that opportunities arose that allowed Tsuda to reach a broader readership. Iwanami Shoten, the foremost publisher of popular scholarly works, took up some of his earlier writings for republication, and also published new work in high profile series such as Iwanami Lectures—*Currents in Oriental Thought* (Iwanami kōza tōyō shibō 岩波講座東洋思潮) or in the newly established yet highly popular *New Texts* (Iwanami shinsho 岩波新書). Before the end of the decade, Tsuda's reputation had started to spread beyond the limited circle of specialists.

During the same period, however, Japan's political and ideological landscape underwent great changes. The party politics of the Taishō 大正 (1912–26) era succumbed under the onslaught of early Shōwa 昭和 (1926–89)
militarism. The year 1925 brought universal male suffrage but also heralded an age of stricter thought control, culminating in the crushing of any legal or political view other than the orthodox, emperor-centered one. It was against this backdrop of ever-tightening ideological constraints that Tsuda’s analysis of national myths, in which he stressed their ahistoricity and the impact of foreign influence, incurred indignation in ultranationalist circles. Misgivings were also mounting over his work concerning China—not because it was explicitly critical of contemporary policy, but because it was rather explicit in its criticism of pan-Asianism. In November 1938, the same month as Prime Minister Konoe broadcast his statement on the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, Iwanami published *Chinese Thought and Japan* (*Shinashisō to nibon*), which claimed that there was no such thing as an ‘Orient,’ and that the inclusion of Indian, Chinese and Japanese cultures into one Asian civilization was preposterous. Ultranationalist resentment surged and soon led to Tsuda’s official indictment, trial and conviction. His career was stymied and he narrowly avoided a prison sentence.

After the war, however, the tables were turned; Tsuda reappeared on the intellectual stage and continued to publish for another 15 years. A number of his pre-war works were re-edited and his ‘journalistic’ contributions in the mass media attracted public attention. Nonetheless, by the time of his death in 1961, Tsuda was a name from the past. This was despite—or perhaps precisely because of—his public stance after the war. Mainstream academic opinion in the post-war era felt quite uncomfortable, to say the least, with his rather conservative viewpoints.

Remarkably, the Tsuda image that survived into the late twentieth century excluded many significant aspects of his work. An image of him arose which did not incorporate his substantial pre-war production on China, reduced the issue of his 1941 trial to the reasons noted in the verdict (*lèse majesté*, that is, an avowed ambiguity on the historical nature of the imperial ancestry), overlooked many of the political implications of his pre-war work on literary history, and neglected almost all of his post-war writings.

It is my intention here to take a closer look at Tsuda’s views on China and its particularities in both pre-war and post-war contexts, focusing on his culture-oriented discourse on modernization and colonization with regard to Japan and China. I believe that Tsuda’s critique of the Orient and his particular stance on China ought to be seen as an integral and even crucial part of his oeuvre. To exclude them would result in a partial and perhaps even flawed understanding of those parts of his career—such as his views on the content of Japanese tradition, or his trial—that received continued attention after the war, and following his death. His pre-war views on Japanese intellectual and literary traditions and his legal predicament at the hands of ultranationalists cannot be brought together convincingly if we fail to examine his views on Japanese, Chinese and world history in their entirety, in terms of content as well as of form.
The Early Development of Tsuda’s Research on China

As the scion of a village-based samurai family, Tsuda received a thorough classical education, with considerable attention given to his study of Chinese classical texts. It seems, however, that these did not fire his imagination despite his purportedly romantic, literature-oriented nature. It was only after his meeting with Shiratori Kurakichi in 1895 that he started to harbour a keen interest in history, became a high-school teacher and expended much time and effort reading books on art and on Edo and pre-Edo Japan, as well as Western literature and historical works.

Tsuda’s first steps as a professional scholar brought him back in touch with ‘mainland’ issues, more specifically issues concerning Manchuria and Korea. In 1908, at Shiratori’s invitation, he started working in the Research Section of the South Manchurian Railway Company, which had been established shortly after the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905. The scholarly method of the Section reflected that of its head, Shiratori, who advocated objectivistic and scrupulous textual research in the tradition of Ranke and avoided as far as possible any active interpretation of intellectual legacies. The research that Shiratori, Tsuda and a handful of other young scholars produced there was taken very seriously in the academic world, as it was thorough and, so it seemed, devoid of any explicit colonial aim. Many of the researchers were hired by Japan’s top universities. By the time Tsuda left the Research Section, he had grown from a relatively unknown high-school teacher into an academic, to whom a post at Waseda University would be offered. Although the Section as Tsuda had known it ceased to exist in 1914 (when officials of the Ministry of Finance and the military leaders in the Railway Company deemed its output to be of scant use to the colonization effort), Tsuda continued to publish in its journal, Research Report on the Historical Geography of Manchuria and Korea (Mansen rektshi chiri kenkyû bôoku 満鮮歴史地理研究報告), abbreviated as Research Report on Manchuria and Korea (Mansen bôoku 満鮮報告), which received continuing financial support from the Railway Company until 1939. It is an ironic twist of history that the researchers in the Section, who were utterly convinced that their work was purely scholarly, were reinforced in that opinion by the skepticism of the very authorities that had first hired them. Most present-day observers agree that their self-proclaimed objectivity worked as a blindfold rather than as a guiding principle.

17 For Tsuda’s youth and early career, see Ōmuro Mikio, “Seinen Tsuda Sökichî ni okeru hanguaku no mondai” [The Question of Literature in Relation to the Young Tsuda Sokichi], in Sabiso no kenkyû 思想的研究 [Research on Thought], vol. 1, no. 1 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1967), pp. 1–35; Ienaga Saburô, Tsuda Sökichî no sabiso-shi-tekki kenkyû [Intellectual Historical Research on Tsuda Sokichî] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1972), pp. 1–81; Mizokami Akira, “Tôyô-gaku no keifu: Tsuda Sökichî” [The Ancestry of Oriental Studies], in Shinika Sinica 1.2 (1990), p. 96 in particular; for Tsuda’s research on Manchurian historical geography, see Ienaga, TSZ, vol. 24, pp. 37–47. The compilation of their research on Manchuria was translated into German as “Beiträge zur historischen Geographie der Mandschurei,” in two volumes, between 1912 and 1914 (that copies ever made their way to Germany was translated does not, however, mean that copies ever made their way to Germany in substantial numbers, if at all). See Hatada Takashi, “Nihon ni okeru tôyô-shi-gaku no dentô” [The Tradition of the Study of Oriental History in Japan], in Rektshi-gaku kenkyû [Historical Scholarship Research], 270 (November 1962), p. 30. For Tsuda’s research on Manchurian historical geography, see TSZ, vol. 12.

18 Tsuda mentions that in order to assist Shiratori to compile a textbook on European history, he had to read Shiratori’s notes on the lectures of Riess, an effort which first stirred his interest in world history. See TSZ, vol. 24, p. 93. Ienaga gives a list of the books Tsuda read during the early years of his career; see Ienaga, Tsuda Sökichî no sabiso-shi-tekki kenkyû, pp. 37–47.

19 See Tanaka, Japan’s Orient, p. 236ff. The compilation of their research on Manchuria was translated into German as “Beiträge zur historischen Geographie der Mandschurei,” in two volumes, between 1912 and 1914 (that copies ever made their way to Germany was translated does not, however, mean that copies ever made their way to Germany in substantial numbers, if at all). See Hatada Takashi, “Nihon ni okeru tôyô-shi-gaku no dentô” [The Tradition of the Study of Oriental History in Japan], in Rektshi-gaku kenkyû [Historical Scholarship Research], 270 (November 1962), p. 30. For Tsuda’s research on Manchurian historical geography, see TSZ, vol. 12.

The division of labour in the Research Section required Tsuda to focus on the early history of Korea. He did this by spending entire days peering at ancient maps and documents in a small room in Azabu, uptown Tokyo, where the Section was housed. Tsuda did not once leave Japan.\(^\text{21}\) Even if geographical distance and the supposed scholarly independence of the Section helped to shield its participants’ consciousness—and consciences—from developments on the continent, it certainly did not preclude certain fundamental assumptions about Chinese, Korean and Manchurian tradition, or certain political and even military concerns about events taking place in Beijing, Seoul or Harbin. Hatada Takashi has pointed out that the expansion of the object of ‘oriental studies’ in Japan followed the expansion of the Japanese empire; awareness of this fact, however, was conspicuously lacking among scholars of ‘Asia’ in Japan.\(^\text{22}\)

Sometimes the issues were quite obvious, but often they were more veiled. In one of Tsuda’s first pieces he tries to establish which river the old name referred to, the Yalu (Kor. Annokkang) or the Taedongkang. This was important in view of modern territorial claims, as the river was seen as the historical demarcation between the Chinese and their ‘barbarian’ neighbors. In other words, if ancient records could show that historical China ended at the Yalu rather than the Taedongkang, that would help to justify Japan’s claims over that northern part of Korea and would lay the foundation for the claim that Manchuria was not a historical part of China either. Was it nothing more than a slip of the tongue when, on another occasion, Shiratori compared the expansionist aspirations of Koguryō, the state that was formed in northern Korea around the first century AD, with those of imperial Russia in modern times?\(^\text{23}\) Can Tsuda’s views on ancient Korean culture (that it was badly underdeveloped, tributary to China and certainly not qualified to “introduce our culture to [the rest of] the world”) be cut loose from Shiratori’s comments on his sense of a duty to “protect and guide” the Korean people, with whose “management” the Japanese had been entrusted?\(^\text{24}\) While some authors point out that Tsuda and Shiratori did not share the same ideas on Asia, it is clear that they both believed in the necessity of a Japanese presence on the mainland.\(^\text{27}\)

Diary records from the late Meiji show that the young Tsuda was not in fact very happy with the research that it was his task to conduct. But his resentment did not spring from political considerations. Soon after his appointment, he found his romanticist ideals, his wish to become a man of letters, being suffocated amid the piles of documents that were stacked up to the ceiling of his office. It has been suggested that the frustration of being surrounded all day by the “stinking” classical texts of “cham’-kô” and “yobo” derogatory epithets which Tsuda used in his diary) lay at the base of his resentment.\(^\text{28}\)

Putting psychology aside, it is true that Tsuda did not leave much to suggest that he felt anything beyond a scholarly interest in what was happening on the mainland. He certainly did not identify with the ordeals of the Korean or.

\(^{21}\) There must have been possibilities, and even offers for him to do so. Okamoto mentions that Naïto Konan went to China five times during his tenure at Kyoto University alone. See Okamoto Shumpei, “Japanese Responses to Chinese Nationalism,” in China in the 1920s: nationalism and revolution, ed. F. Gilbert Chen and Thomas H. Etzold (New York: New Viewpoints, Franklin Watts, 1976), pp.161–75.

\(^{22}\) See Hatada, “Nihon ni okerutoyō-shi-gaku no dentō,” p.50. Hatada does not refrain from implicating Ikeuchi Hiroshi, his tutor and one-time colleague of Tsuda at the Research Section. Goi, in his 1976 book, also pointed out that Shiratori was still being considered a ‘sanctuary’ (sei’iki) in Japan. See Goi, “Hajime ni” [Preliminary remarks], in Kindai nihon to yōshi-shi-gaku. See also Ogura Yoshiko, “Tsuda Sōkichi to chūgoku” [Tsuda Sōkichi and China], in Rekishi-gaku kenkyū 391 (December 1972): 16–25.


\(^{25}\) See Bungaku ni arawaretaru waga kokumin shiso no kenkyū [Research on the Thought of our People as Reflected in Literature] (Tokyo: Rakuyōdō, 1921), p.1ff (25ff. in TSZ, separate vol.2, the post-war revised edition (1951) found in TSZ, vol.4 leaves out this remark).

\(^{26}\) For a specific work on early Korean history (and its lack of originality), see TSZ, vol.12, “Sankokushi-ki kokuri-ki no hihan” [A Critique of the Koguryo Record in the Samguksal], pp.392–466.

\(^{27}\) See Shiratori’s Foreword to Tsuda’s Chōsen rekishi chiru kenkyū [Research on the Historical Geography of Korea], in TSZ, vol.11.

\(^{28}\) For examples of Tsuda’s negative view of China (and Korea), see Ienaga, Tsuda Sōkichi no shisō-shi-teki kenkyū, pp.208–19. Ômuro provides a depiction of Tsuda (over
as a romantic youth, fond of Goethe’s Werther, depressed by a messy divorce and fed up with the world’s “materialism” (kōri-shugi 功利主義)—an evil of which he would accuse the (ancient) Chinese on many occasions. See Ōmuro Mikio, “Seinen Tsuda Sōkichi ni okeru bungaku no mondai,” in Shisō no kenkyū, pp.20–5; see also TSZ, vol.26, p.477: “I don’t believe they will be able to pull off Maeterlinck’s ‘Le Miracle de Saint Antoine’ . . . but, well, thinking of how it will bring me from the vulgarity of the last few days into more artistic spheres, another three hours seems like a long time to wait. I’ve had enough of the stench of these Korean and Chinese books.” The Teikoku-za theatre was near Tsuda’s office; he could see the roof from his window.


29 “Shina shiso no eikyō” [The Influence of Chinese Thought], in TSZ, separate vol.1, pp.137–43.

30 In TSZ, ibid., p.354 or the conclusion, pp.488–95.


Chinese people, let alone show appreciation for their struggle for a modern identity. His mainland objects of study were measured against the unbending yardstick of their cultural legacy: China was as it had always been—particular, impenetrable, monolithic, and very dissimilar to Japan or the West. In this sense, the shift that brought Tsuda from his research on Manchuria and Korea to his scholarly treatment of China did not constitute a rupture in his œuvre, especially insofar as the underlying intellectual-historical assumptions of his work are concerned. Still, a certain gap needed to be bridged before he turned his gaze to the mainland as a primary focus of interest. Tsuda did not simply expand his scope of interest from Korea and Manchuria toward China; rather, he reached China only after a lengthy journey through Japan’s intellectual history. This detour is crucial for an understanding of why he turned to China at all.29

The core of argument in Tsuda’s first famous work on Japanese mythology is considered by many to be the demystification of the divine origin of the imperial house. This demystification cannot be isolated, however, from Tsuda’s assessment of Chinese thought in Japan. Tsuda explained the rupture between the oldest, oral transmissions and the records found in the early eighth-century scriptures as the product of political schemes by courtiers who had used Chinese political concepts to justify their role in the state structure that had arisen after the Taika Reforms of 645 AD, based on the Tang model. In his 1913 work on mythology we find a section devoted to the influence of China on Japan,30 where it is pointed out that certain terms (such as ‘lasting world’ [tokoyo 常世]) or certain stories (such as the ascension of Yamato Takeru’s dead spirit [rei 灵] to heaven as a white bird) betray the influence of Chinese concepts of heaven. Japan’s earliest traditions never connected the Heavenly Plain [takamagahara 天原] to abstract concepts such as eternity or the afterlife; rather, it was a place of the past, and the souls of the dead went down, not up. In his 1917 work also, on the Kojiki and Nihonshoki, he devoted attention to how and to what extent Chinese thought had influenced Japanese thinking.31 For instance, he sought to explain the discrepancy between the original Japanese oral traditions and the eventual actual records of both scriptures. Also in his magnum opus Research on the Thought of Our People as Reflected in Literature (Bungaku ni arawaretaru wagakumin shisō no kenkyū 文学に現れたわが国民思想の研究) of 1916 onward, the concept of “national thought” not only implied a departure from traditional leader-focused historiography, but also a rupture with the view that the Japanese intellectual tradition was all about borrowing from Chinese thought. Of course, Tsuda recognized that China had influenced Japan, but he rejected the idea that the influence had been pervasive, and that some type of common heritage had resulted from it.32

These shorter references can be considered the embryo of what would develop into his rather outspoken ideas on China in later texts, a part of his
production that post-war comment labeled the ‘dark side’ of his research as a whole.\textsuperscript{33} It would take Tsuda another few years to bring these scattered observations together into a more systematic view.

\textit{The Maturation of Tsuda’s Research on China}

Tsuda continued to publish on Manchurian history in the 1910s. Apart from one 1914 publication in \textit{Journal for Historical Scholarship} (\textit{Shigaku Zasshi} 史学雑誌), all his research appeared as articles in the journals \textit{Report on Oriental Studies} (\textit{Tōyō Gakubō} 東洋学報) and \textit{Mansen Hōkokukai}, and their prime focus was still on Manchuria, in particular the Liao 遼, the presumed forefathers of the Altai, Tungusic and other tribes or regions in that area. He published his first research paper on China proper in January 1915,\textsuperscript{34} but his publication activities on China really picked up in 1920, with the appearance of an extensive study in \textit{Mansen Hōkokukai}.\textsuperscript{35} After 1920 Tsuda produced a host of papers on China, brought together repeatedly in separate volumes.\textsuperscript{36}

Although the bulk of Tsuda’s output in the 1920s was focused on China, it was intended as a direct answer to questions that had arisen from his encounter with the Chinese influence on the Japanese classics. His methodological approach, therefore, was very reminiscent of his work on ancient Korea, Manchuria and Japan. It took the form of a meticulous scrutiny of primary source material, in which he looked closely at the use of words, terms and phrases and, through comparison and induction, tried to establish their age and origin, thus making clear which passages were contradictory and which elements were more ancient and thus more original or authentic. From there he then constructed a general outlook on the topic at hand, which—or so he claimed—was dictated by the examples found, and not by a pre-existing, abstract-theoretical notion.\textsuperscript{37} It was an approach that allowed Tsuda to bring together those elements that he thought relevant, often in disregard of existing scholarship and its received distinctions. Tsuda never interwove references to previous research done by other authors into his texts; he made no direct reference to them and engaged in no direct debate. Records show that he did do a lot of reading, but very little of that is found in the final texts.\textsuperscript{38} As a result, Tsuda’s works often offered a set of quite unique conclusions, which proved very hard to complement or expand, even (or especially) for his closest disciples.\textsuperscript{39}

Even though—or perhaps precisely because—he approached his topic with great methodological care, it is not difficult to observe that the earlier idea of China as a latent ‘alter’ to the Japanese ‘ego’ had evolved into a more conspicuous antinomy. While diary notes of the late nineteenth century show that Tsuda cherished certain hopes for the modernization of China, his stance gradually shifted toward frustration and denigration, and in the 1920s...

\textsuperscript{33} See for instance Ogura, \textit{Rekishi gaku kenkyū}.  
\textsuperscript{35} \textit{jodai shina-jin no shukyo shisō} (上代支那人の宗教思想) [The Religious Thought of the Ancient Chinese], in \textit{TSZ}, vol.28, pp.185–271.  
\textsuperscript{37} For considerations concerning method (relating to Shiratori, Naitō and Tsuda), see Goi, \textit{Kindai nihon to toyo-shi-gaku}, ch.2, pp.79–161. Tsuda mentions methodological issues sporadically in his pre-war oeuvre; see for instance, vol.13, pp.97ff.  
\textsuperscript{38} A sizeable enumeration of existing research—a critical bibliography so to speak—on Japanese mythology, compiled as a part of his defense in the 1941 \textit{lese-majesté} trial, can be found in \textit{TSZ}, vol.24, pp.571–618, but even the post-war republication of his myth research (\textit{Nihon koten no kenkyū}, 1948–50) does not refer directly to previous scholarship. Even the chapter in his 1947 \textit{Nihon jodai-shi no kenkyū} entitled “Jūrai no shosetsu ni taishite” [Against Existing Theories] provides no specific names or titles. See \textit{TSZ}, vol.3, pp.81–133.  
\textsuperscript{39} Watanabe Yoshimichi points out that the post-war Marxist historiographers were the only ones who were really able to “dialectically sublate” (shiyo 正論) Tsuda’s views. See Watanabe Yoshimichi, “Tsuda shigaku no tokushitsu to genkai-teki iki” [Characteristics and Present Meaning of Tsuda’s \textit{Lover}
an increasing number of outspokenly negative expressions can be found in his work: he spoke with contempt of scholars who were sympathetic toward China as "mouldy scholars of Han learning" (kabi no baeta kanga ITS Dha) and compared his academic interest in China to that of a biologist examining excrement in a test tube. It would take another few years before Tsuda would go beyond these scattered statements and devote a publication to "Chinese thought" as such, but it cannot be denied that even in his academic publications of the time, Chinese intellectual tradition no longer served as a prop within the setting of literary creation and creativity in ancient and mediaeval Japan, but found itself pushed into a corner, a small and dark one, where it was not only set apart from Japan but 'typecast,' so to speak, as an old and venerable yet obdurate mandarin, wary of change and the outside world.

In his whole oeuvre, Tsuda devoted only three texts to the post-Han era, and not even one to post-Song developments.41 Seemingly, he did not deem the 1,900 years following the decline of the Early Han dynasty to be worth much in terms of intellectual development. Even the changes that took place at a gradually accelerating pace in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century China were not able to shake Tsuda's view: he interpreted the revolutions of both 1911 and 1949 as products of a cyclical pattern of "mandate change" (Ch.: geming 革命).42 China's ancient social and intellectual traditions were represented not just as a part of China's heritage but also as highly relevant for modern history. The premise of his China research, namely that China had a different tradition with a peculiar and often negative effect on Japanese thought, developed into the explicit belief that Chinese traditional thought was essentially defunct, with a systematized incapability to modernize. Tsuda would pursue this argument with mounting intensity.

What did Tsuda write about Chinese intellectual traditions? On the one hand there are the contents of his papers, that is, the outcomes of his textual analysis. On the other there is the underlying perspective, a tenacious thing like a thick white sinew in a chunk of soft red meat. It would take far too much space to deal with the contents of the whole body of Tsuda's writings on China, and to examine his preconceptions in each of them. What can be said about the relation between the content and the underlying perspective in his work is that the 1920s and 1930s witnessed an increasingly self-conscious and elaborate stress on the latter in relation to (and perhaps even to the detriment of) the former. In a typical work of the 1920s, a text on Taoism,33 Tsuda sought to undermine the assumption that the Taoist texts represent a crystallization of ancient or original thought, essentially unaffected by and in opposition to Confucianism. To this end, he revealed disturbing contradictions and incomprehensible combinations of characters, phrases and ideas in the transmitted texts of the Taoists (Laozi 老子, Zhuangzi 庄子, Liezi 列子 and so on), for which the only explanation could be, in Tsuda's view, that these were products of the end of the Warring States period (476–221 BC) at the
earliest, and not of the times of Confucius and Mencius.\footnote{See "Juka to dōka to no kosho ni tsuite," in TSZ, vol.28, p.273.} To give just one example, the Laozi is observed to be quite outspoken in its criticism of the Confucian stress on "benevolence and righteousness" by leaders as a crucial tool for the creation of the socially good, yet the combination 仁義 (Ch.: renyi, Jpn.: jingi) to which the Laozi refers does not appear anywhere in texts of Confucius' time. Tsuda argued that the only possible conclusion would be that the Laozi was of a later date than Confucius—or even Mencius, who would not have ignored criticism of a concept that was so crucial.\footnote{In 1931, for example, relating to the origin and essence of the Zhuangzi, Feng Youlan argued that the author may well have been a contemporary of Mencius, even though Mencius never mentions him. This may be explained by Mencius's interpretation of Zhuangzi as a follower of Yangzi 墊子. See Fung Youlan, History of Chinese Philosophy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951), p.223.} Tsuda argued that the Laozi contained far more politically and socially oriented ideas than could be explained by the theory of an ancient origin, and its cultural and cosmological 'design' contained far too many gaps. Zhuangzi was in no way authentic but was written by many authors with different backgrounds, reacting against the influence of Confucianism, but also taking over many of its elements, such as the role of the Sages in creating the moral paradigm by which man should live (even if negatively valued), or the stressing of the bond between heaven and humankind, shifting focus from the universe or realm to the individual person—an internalization which Tsuda links back to Mencius. The Xunzi, normally judged to be a Confucian text, became part of a hybrid legacy that was accepted by Confucians of the early Han period. Not coincidentally, both currents shared a positive stance toward the political realm. While Taoists rejected Confucian intellectual formalism, the social aspirations of their teachings never went beyond prescriptions for personal safety—apart from, rather than within, society. The Liezi 列子, then, was entirely fictitious.

In short, Confucian scholars were influenced by Taoism in that they tried to reconnect heaven and humankind through the rites, while Taoists took over Confucian elements by referring to the saints and the social order. Neither, however, was able to transcend the Chinese soil out of which they sprouted; Tsuda regarded the essential traits of both (the fixation on the relation between Man and Heaven, the divergence between the internal and external nature of moral prescriptions, and the intensity of the attempts to encompass these classical notions in texts of a later date) as revealing or even determining Chinese intellectual tradition as a whole.

Notwithstanding the attention they received, it would be hard to maintain that the contents of these works were path-breaking, as they were actually quite in line with contemporaneous views. The attraction of Tsuda's arguments seems to have rested in their appearance of being reasonable, neutral and text-based. At the same time—apart from the general observation that they were products of their time—they cannot be fitted easily into ongoing discussions among Japanese sinologists of the period. It seems that their context was not, as noted, debate-oriented, but rather idiosyncratic. The 'outwardness' of Tsuda's research was not to be found in a dialogue with other scholars on the topic.\footnote{Koyasu points out that Tsuda's 1946 work on the Lunyu clearly took Takeuchi Yoshio's 1926 Rōshi genshi 子原始 [The Prehistory of the Laozi] into (critical) consideration, but no clear reference to it is to be found in Tsuda. See Koyasu Norikuni, Kindaichi no arukeorοji [The Archeology of Modern Knowledge] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996), pp.55–109. Tachibana Shiraki reached similar conclusions concerning the relationship between Taoism and Confucianism. See Lincoln Li, The China Factor in Modern Japanese Thought the case of Tachibana Shiraki (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996), pp.11–12.} It rested in Tsuda's wish to complement his own research, that is to establish that Chinese tradition did not provide any universal or
transcendent truth, and that even its most revered ‘classics’ could not serve as a model, not for Japan nor even for the Chinese of the modern age. Tsuda wanted to point out that Taoism may have represented part of the essence of traditional Chinese ‘life sentiment’ insofar as it encompassed the rites and rituals of everyday religious practice, but that it coincided with Confucianism in standing aloof from actual political practice. Neither Confucianism nor Taoism was able to formulate an agenda for outward moral or constructive political action, and thus to envision ways to achieve fundamental change, to relate to the world outside China, or to form a national consciousness beyond family or class boundaries.

Although his book on Taoism often referred to a Warring States context, Tsuda did not refrain from arguing that the main reason for the conflict of that period was to be found in the national character (民族性, minzoku-sei) of the Chinese, in geographical conditions and in a socio-political situation that prevented the growth of a sense of commonality (公共性, kōkyō-sei). None of this, however, was particular to that one period. He maintained that morality was reduced to edification and political skills, which overwhelmed all other concerns in social life. In a society such as the Chinese one, self-guarding (保身, hoshin) was, and therefore is, the only valid preoccupation for the individual. The 1925 article that lay at the base of the more extensive 1927 volume revealingly concludes: “Is it not obvious [當然, tōzen] therefore, that the theory of the Confucianists and the thought of the Taoists were combined?”

One specific methodological issue that needs to be considered here is that Tsuda was strongly convinced of the need for any thinking to be rooted in the ‘daily life’ of the people. It could strive to play a positive historical role only if it arose from this popular base. Thought that came from the outside or did not take into account the daily life of the people was doomed to fail, or to float on the surface of society as oil on water. The recognition of changing life conditions at the lowest level and the attempt to adapt thought to these new conditions, was the true engine of intellectual-historical progress. While such an emphasis on popular energies meant a clear rupture with the intellectualism of other strands of thought, it also made it difficult to explain from a methodological point of view how foreign thought could impinge upon people’s daily lives unless they had been ‘ready’ for the new ideas in question. Tsuda argued that the inability of Chinese thought (and Confucianism in particular) to truly affect the daily life of dozens of generations of common Japanese was inevitable, as there was an unbridgeable difference in the life experiences, family structures, social cohesion and national awareness of China and Japan. Tsuda even went a step further to remark that the Chinese intellectual tradition, power-centered and formalistic as it was, stood apart from the real life of Chinese people themselves.

Before the end of the 1920s, Tsuda had abandoned any initial am-

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47 See TSZ, vol.28, p.312.
bivalence about the prospects for China in favor of dark pessimism. An article from August 1929 captures the essence of the early Tsuda’s ambivalence of hope and frustration, and the growing emphasis on the latter:

This is how the intellectual world of China has come to posterity ... there has been progress to some extent ..., but this is nothing of such a kind as to move the very base of its life and its life-guiding thought. Yet, as it has come in touch with European and American culture in recent times, it has wavered for the first time. And thus the Chinese people were forced to alter fundamentally their ancient thought, or to destroy it altogether, if they wanted to stand up anew in the modern world ... the Chinese can borrow any thought that is useful to them, and they should not shy away from using it. But their real life, and the people’s character, cannot be changed overnight. And thus, if this does not change, it will prove very hard to understand even the thought of the present world as it is. Therefore at that point a general chaos will occur in Chinese society and people’s hearts. How the Chinese people will be able to create a new life out of this chaos is something we will only know after the passage of much more time.49

Many more papers and articles would follow suit, with similar issues taking central position. In his books on the Zuozhuan 左傳 and the Lunyu 論語 (Analects), for example, we find a demystification of ancient sources, an unveiling of the contradictory nature of these ancient sources and tales, a refutation of historical interpretations derived from them, and a rejection of the idea that their message could go beyond the cultural boundaries of China.

The 1930s did not bring change, but saw the publication of the volume, Chinese Thought and Japan [Shina shisō to nihon], compiled in November 1938. Its first part dates from January 1933.50 If we use the same metaphor as above, we can safely state that this is the most “sinewy” of Tsuda’s pre-war texts on China (a quality from which a 1959 republication did not subtract). The points made in this volume are a condensed version of his earlier views, a systematic and explicit treatment of Chinese tradition as opposed to the Japanese: the latter had borrowed from the former, but had never become part of it.

It is my conviction that the lives of the Japanese and the Chinese are entirely different in all respects ... the more one knows about Japan, and the more one knows about China, the more a strong feeling arises that the Japanese and Chinese are inhabitants of entirely different worlds.51

In August 1927, in the first foreword to his work on Taoism, Tsuda had already insisted that his interest in China was a purely scholarly one, and that it “does not mean I praise [sanbi 賛美] or respect [sonshō 尊称]” China.52 In 1933, the distance had become unbridgeable: Tsuda stated that, in view of the necessary connection to ‘daily life,’ cultural exchange with another people therefore was “essentially impossible”—not just for the Chinese or the Japanese, but for the whole world.53 Even the results of academic, literary or technical endeavor could not be exchanged. In the foreword to the 1959 republication of this work, Tsuda even included a plea for abandoning

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50 See TSZ, vol.20; the work was first published in January 1933 in the series Iwanami Köza Tetsugaku under the title “Nihon ni okeru shina shisō ishoku-shi” [History of the Transplantation of Chinese Thought in Japan].
52 See TSZ, vol.13, p.5.
53 The exact term is bonraiari-e-bekarazaru koto (本来ありえべきからざること); the Japanese word bekarazaru (べきからざる) conveys a connotation of possibility as well as prescription (both negative here: cannot, should not).
the use of Chinese characters “as soon as possible,” as he felt they were not compatible with the “academic spirit and method of our age.”  

A handful of other essays that he wrote during this period—Research Attitudes of Chinese Thought (Shina-sbisô-kenkyû no taido 支那思想研究の態度) (1934); Political Thought of the Kingly Way (Ôdô-seiji-sbisô 王道政治思想) (1934); and The Destiny of China Scholarship in Japan (Nihon ni okeru Shina-gaku nosbime 王道の使命) (1939)—likewise reveal the methodological limitations of Tsuda’s China research. All of them put China’s intellectual and literary legacy in a negative light, and although the first and third of these articles mention that knowledge about China was insufficient and that more attention should be devoted to the “true life” (jisseikatsu 実生活) of the Chinese, no doubt is left about the fact that Japan has a “mission” (sbime 使命) to lead China out of its backwardness, as

... its scholarship is so much less developed than ours ... which is because the Chinese have not yet understood the true meaning and research methods of modern times, and also because it is very hard to criticize the thought of one’s own people rigorously.  

It is interesting to see how Tsuda became more and more aware of the political implications of his views, yet still refused to build on that insight. The article on the Kingly Way (王道 Jpn.: ôdô; Ch.: wangdao), for instance, in which he completely rejected any claim that this traditional concept with its stress on virtuous rule could be politically effective in a modern environment, cannot be divorced from what every educated Japanese at that time must have known, namely that the very same concept was being used as a kind of official ideology of the so-called Manchurian Empire (Mansû teikoku 滿州帝国). At the same time, Tsuda’s comments must have suggested to every educated Japanese a veiled criticism of the Kingly Way as used in slogans to justify the empire’s policies inside and outside Japan; his lines declared the incompatibility of “the Kingly Way” with the traditional Japanese situation of an emperor standing amidst his people and not above them (or even with the modern situation of constitutional monarchy). Be that as it may, Tsuda added that scholars should indeed contribute to “the activities of the nation to which the scholar belongs, and the broad developments of his age,” which includes, in this case, helping the Chinese realize that they can profit greatly from Japan’s “ethno-national superiority” (minzoku-teki yûshû-sei 民族的優秀性).  

During the early 1940s, Tsuda became the target of ultranationalist aggression himself, for his early work on the imperial mythology. He continued his China research nonetheless, to the extent that his energies were not all consumed by his trial, and published the results of that research, “The Analects and the Thought of Confucius” (Rongo to koshi no sbisô 論語と孔子の思想) immediately after the war. After 1946, however, it could be said that
Tsuda produced hardly anything new that was of real scholarly value; any 'meat' left had turned to sinew by then.

As noted, Tsuda's career shows a mounting path toward more conscious and outspoken criticism of China. I will finish this section with an 'anthology' of some of the categories and epithets that Tsuda used to depict China, its people, its leaders, and its thought and religion (these are arranged not in chronological but in 'typological' order). First, Tsuda mobilized the old argument that China's geographical landscape made it unreceptive to change, being at the same time too populous and too extended; the primary ties binding people were family relations with a stress on authority and ritual rather than human warmth, as exemplified in Confucian ethics; religious life is no more than a thin layer over a multitude of childish superstitions, without notions of unity or providence; metaphysical or logical speculation on the essence of reality is absent; life is considered mere existence, which cannot be refined through social bonding or historical accumulation; life, which is lonely (kodoku-teki 孤独的), can only be made bearable by becoming a hermit, or by individualistic and wealth-oriented pleasure-seeking; Chinese classical thought offers no examples of a search for practical knowledge—facts are continually distorted, fitted into preposterous systems and subjected to moral doctrines, held aloof from real life and kept in the service of political power; and all social considerations are subjected to the power structure, controlled by selfish and cruel leaders. Therefore China does not constitute one people, does not recognize a world outside itself, and has no concept of community, society or international world order; not being able to think of themselves as one people, the Chinese are not able to achieve a sense of solidarity, which leads to an absence of public space, of commonality, and thus to their incapacity to form a nation or to engender a ethno-national (minzoku 民族) concept. Its language is a “particular constraint,” inarticulate and formless, or bluntly put “childish muttering” (katagoto 言言), Its intellectual life is fossilized, as shown by the fact that the downfall of Confucianism has not given rise to any democratic reaction among its people. China is unable to learn from the outside world, and from Japan in particular. Its modernization is regionally confined, shallow and limited to the upper class. Its 1911 revolution was the mere repetition of an age-old pattern of dynastic change.

Though far from exhaustive, this list gives some idea of the greater picture Tsuda presented to his readership. What seems to have bothered him most, however—and there probably lies the essence of his almost inexplicable detestation of China—is China's injurious influence on Japan and its 'proper' traditions. Japanese scholars have for many centuries accepted China's intellectual artifacts, thereby emasculating Japanese intellectual life and creating a slavish attitude among themselves toward foreign examples—the same attitude that engendered the inability to stop the rise of ultranationalism, and eventually the invasion of China itself.

60 In "Kanji to Nihon bunka" [Chinese Characters and Japanese Culture], in Kokugo Undo [The National Language Movement] 3.8 (August 1939); see TSZ, vol.10, pp.63–78.
61 He was quite optimistic about the fate of Korean culture as it had now entered the Japanese cultural sphere, and believed it was only a matter of time before it developed its own particular culture further. See “Nihon bunka to Shina oyobi Chôsen no bunka to no kôryû” [The Exchange Between Japanese Culture and the Cultures of China and Korea], in Iwanami Köza Tôyô Shishô (July 1936); TSZ, vol.20, p.592.
For instance, see “Kanji to nihon bunka,” TSZ, vol. 10, p. 76: “The fact that Japanese are operating (hataraku はたらく) in China means that they have to break China open (kaibatsu 開発) with the strength of Japanese culture, and to this end, the language and writing of Japan should be spread among the Chinese.” As for Japan, he sees its seemingly aggressive stance toward the Asian mainland as part of a historical process which is nothing but the expression of the will of the Japanese people to build a strong nation—the only viable one in Asia. See “Futatabi rekishi-kyōiku ni tsuite” [On History Education Again], Chitó kōron [Central Review] 788 (1953), TSZ, vol. 20, pp. 452–76.

One finds some observations on this correlation of Japan-China relations and Confucian heritage in Warren W. Smith, Confucianism in Modern Japan: a study of conservatism in Japanese intellectual history (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1973), pp. 147–228. Many others (such as Nishi Shin’ichirō 西脇一郎 and Tachibana Shiraki 橘模) in Japan have put great stress on Confucianism as a common heritage, and as a way to bring China and Japan together. See Nakumura Shunsaku, “1930 nendai Nihon ni okeru ‘kokumin’-ka no gensetsu to jukyo, soshite Chugoku” [Nationalizing Discourse in 1930s Japan, and Confucianism, and China], in Nihon shisa-shi, 59 (2001).

Obviously Tsuda never questioned Japan’s rule over Taiwan (from 1895), the annexation of Korea (1910) or the establishment of Manchukuo (満州国 Jpn.: Manshūkoku) (1932); and passages have been found in which he seems to support Japan’s ‘powerful’ stance toward China. Nonetheless, it was more or less clear that Tsuda’s views on Asia were not in agreement with the official doctrine of the late 1930s. This does not mean that Tsuda was an opponent of the regime. His main concern was the safeguarding of Japan as a nation, centered upon the imperial institution. This concern reverberates throughout his oeuvre. He did not, however, accept the idea that Japan had a vital interest in China, or that relations between the two should be determined by any other than pragmatic considerations. There was no point in appealing to cultural ties to justify Japan’s ‘presence’ in China.

The above-mentioned conviction that China was a different world was only part of the explanation for this. Tsuda had had long-standing views on the role of culture and politics, more specifically a deeply ingrained anxiety about any attempts to turn Japan’s cultural symbol par excellence—the imperial institution—into a political one, all the more so if a foreign-bred political construct was to be involved. Not only did he regard Japan’s campaign against China as misguided because of China’s obtuseness, he also rejected the idea of East Asian cultural kinship out of the fear that when (rather than if) ultranationalism’s continental adventures failed, they could endanger the very existence of the empire and the emperor (a worry which the events of late 1945 proved to be not entirely unwarranted). The Co-Prosperity Sphere could (only) end in a ‘Co-Decline Sphere,’ dragging along with it Japan’s identity itself, a unique identity whose essence was unaltered by Asian creeds but was now being linked to a ‘whimsical’ political ideal in which the ‘shared values’ of Confucianism played a considerable part. Coincidentally, Tsuda’s views on the topic were published on a large scale for the first time at the exact moment that the Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere ideology was made official by Prime Minister Konoe himself. Though Tsuda had probably just wanted to speak his mind about cultural and historical issues, he became bound up in the political difficulties that would lead to his indictment soon after (see next section).

There is a certain irony in the fact that Tsuda published many of his works in the journal Tōyō Gakubō, that he was appointed professor in the Research Bureau on Oriental Thought (Tōyō shisō kenkyū-shitsu 東洋思想研究室) of his alma mater, Waseda University, in 1934 and that he was invited to lecture at Tokyo Imperial University on the history of political ideas in the East (tōyō seiji shisō-shi 東洋政治思想史), while he was at the same time authoring essays in which he zealously argued that there was no such thing as ‘the Orient’ apart from a vague geographical designation, such as Eastern Culture, Eastern Thought, Eastern History (Tōyō bunka, tōyō shisō, tōyō-shi
The emphasis on the notion of the Orient in the official doctrine of the 1930s has specific roots. Whereas initially Japan’s actions on the mainland had been explained in terms of self-defence, and of the gradual expansion of that notion into Manchuria, the full-scale conflict with China led to a total mobilization of not only material but also cultural resources. On 3 November 1938, Prime Minister Konoe explained how Japan’s intentions for Asia were not aggressive but served a higher cause: it was Japan’s historical destiny to free Asia from Western dominance and to forge bonds of brotherhood between Asian nations under a Japanese umbrella, a New Order for Asia. It was the realization, on paper at least, of an idea that had existed since the


3. Rekishi Kyōiku [History Education] 68 (November 1931). In the collected works, the editor explains an “x” attached to this title in the table of contents as “left by the author before his death,” meaning “almost the same as ‘rejected’” (baiki 売棄). See TZ, vol.28, p.589.

4. See ibid., p.290.

5. See ibid., pp.367–9.

6. The common heritage of Japan and China is “a complete delusion” (全くの迷妄 mattaku no meima). That viewpoint flew in the face of official opinion, as stated for instance in the 1937 Kokutai no Hongi 国体の本義 [Cardinal Principles of Our National Polity] (Monbusho, 1937), p.1: “Oriental culture, which originated a long time ago in India and China, has been imported into our land and refined [Junka 復化] by the ‘national essence following the divine will’ (kamunagara no kokutai 神惟の国体).”

7. See ibid., p.366.

8. This is in stark contrast to Naitō, who saw modern tendencies already in Song China. See Fogel, Politics and Sinology, pp.xv–xvi and 209–10.

9. As in ibid., p.309: the common heritage of Japan and China is “almost the same as ‘rejected’” (ほぼの迷妄 haiki no meima).
Meiji and had been ‘catalyzed’ by the events of 1905 in particular. Stefan Tanaka identifies the ideas of Tsuda’s guiding teacher, Shiratori, with the rise of the notion of ‘the orient,’ and the ‘orientalist’ (à la Said) mechanism that turned China into the old and traditional, a symbol of the past, the backward, the static—in short, the ‘Other’ to the Japanese ‘Self.’ As it turned out, one of the few points on which Tsuda did not agree with Shiratori was Japan’s link with Asia. Still, Tsuda shared the idea that Japan could play a leading role in Asia, as a model of modern (world) culture. Both Shiratori and Tsuda created an image of an Asia that awaited Japanese guidance.

All in all, however, Tsuda’s views show very little of the tortuousness found in the ideas of many contemporaneous scholars striving to give China a place in their intellectual constructs. Naitō Konan, for example, stood much closer to China; on the one hand he was optimistic, finding modern aspects in Chinese tradition and recognizing the importance of recent developments, but he became more pessimistic in the 1920s, irritated enough by the slow pace of reform and by China’s anti-Japanese movement to cause some to label him “closed, distorted and ethnocentric” after all. Tachibana Shiraki believed in the ideal of a “New East,” linking China and Japan in a struggle against the West, and worked for the colonial authorities in Manchuria, hoping to enlighten Japanese leaders with his research, until he was expelled in 1940. Members of the Showa Research Association (Sōwa Kenkyūkai 昭和研究会), such as Miki Kiyoshi 三木清 (1897-1945), believed in Asian ‘solidarity’ but were never able to dissociate themselves from the Japanese invasion so as to convince their Chinese counterparts. Even the architect of Manšūkoku, Ishiwara Kanji 石原莞爾 (1889-1949) and his ‘brain’ Miyazaki Masayoshi 宮崎正義 (1893-1954) championed an “East-Asian League” (tōa renmei 東亜連盟), opposing the megalomania of Imperial Way thinkers such as Kanokogi Kazunobu 鹿子木員信 (1884-1949) or Ōkawa Shūmei 大川周明 (1886-1957), but nevertheless attracting fierce criticism from the Chinese for their hypocrisy. Yoshino Sakuzō 吉野作造 (1878-1933) recognized the strength of the national movement in China and criticized Japanese aggression on the mainland, but was not able to make any difference politically.

For Tsuda, things were very simple: he rejected any allusion to cultural affinity, but never bothered to elaborate a real vision for the future of Asia. Not without reason, his view has been called “the withering of Asianism” or even “textual-critical nihilism.”

75 See Tanaka, Japan’s Orient, chs.1 and 2.
74 Shiratori was a supporter of the Imperial Rescript on Education, which was imbued with a stress on Confucian values. Tsuda was not, for obvious reasons. See Goi, Kindainibon to tōyō-shi-gaku, “Hajime ni” [Preliminary remarks], “Kunshin kankei o kiso to suru dogi kannen” [The Moral Ideal Based on the Lord Retainer Relationship], Kokoro, 11.7 (1958), in TSZ, vol.6, pp.217-28. See also Iwasaki Nobuo, “Tsuda Sōkichi no Chūgoku-Ajia-kan ni tsuite” [On the China and Asia Views of Tsuda Sokichirō, in Shibun 59 (1995): 46-64.
77 A notion that received some attention in Asia itself; see, for instance, Leonard A. Gordon, Brothers Against the Raj: a biography of Indian nationalists Sarat and Subhas Chandra Bose (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p.807.
79 See Chan and Eizold, China in the 1920s, p.173.
82 See, for instance, “Dai-tōa-ken to nihon,” in which he stresses the need to “internalize” China and India, in Dai-tōa minzoku-shi [History of the Nations of Greater East Asia] (Tokyo: Masu Shobō, 1944). Inoue went as far as to say that Japan’s culture was made up half of Confucianism and half of Buddhism. See Horikentoku and Inoue Tetsujiro, Shakkamuni-den [The Life of Sakyamuni] (Tokyo: Maekawa-bun-eikaku, 1911), p.5.
86 See Koyasu, Kindaichibon arukeorii, p.97.
Tsuda’s post-war essays show that he did not change his views after 1945. In the January 1955 issue of the conservative magazine *Heart (Kokoro)*, Tsuda published “Asia is Not One” (“Ajia wa hitotsu de wa nai” アジアは一つではない), an essay in which he reiterated very similar arguments, pointing at Japan’s (not Asia’s!) potential for overcoming the shortcomings of modernity: the sophistication of its inner life; its knowledge, capability and humanity; its stress on independent effort; its morality that stresses modesty and thankfulness; and its work ethic. Just as with the Co-Prosperity Sphere idea, which in 1955 he had labelled a “very selfish statement,”86 Tsuda rejected the rampant, shallow “journalism” of the post-war era that took China as a model. He argued that Asia may need attention, but only as a part of the world, not as “one entity.” Japan was, above all, a part of the world, and a unique one.

What was the core of Japanese uniqueness? Here again, the imperial tradition comes into the picture. Tsuda argued that, while China had had its emperors too, it certainly was not one dynasty which had ruled (and they had not even all been Chinese), and emperors had been overthrown by scheming courtiers and the people they governed, often by means of violence and cruelty.87 Already in his earlier works Tsuda had devoted great attention to the observation that Japanese emperors played a non-political role in society, forming a cultural core around which a national consciousness took shape.88 They had gained their position in an almost organic manner, without violence or struggle, and they had stood amidst their people ever since—as ancient Japanese poetry shows, featuring poems by emperors right next to those of simple fishermen (again unlike China’s poetry, which was wordy and elitist).89 Japanese emperors were not Sons of Heaven in the Chinese way—abstract, moralistic, transcendent—but descendants of a ‘primus inter pares’ family that had ruled with remarkable humanity—gentle, warm, lovable.90

Was it then a cynical twist of fate that Tsuda, who cherished such a ‘cleansed’ image of the Japanese emperor, was put to trial for alleged *lèse-majesté vis-à-vis* the imperial institution? Or were there other reasons?

**The Trial: Reasons, Outcome and Implications**

The Tsuda Incident of 1939–42 was a series of events leading to the legal prosecution of Tsuda and his publisher between 1939 and 1942. The charge against Tsuda was that of *lèse-majesté*. In his early works (of the 1910s) he had conducted and published research that revealed that the imperial mythology was full of contradictions and betrayed clear signs of foreign influence. It could only be a historical creation, especially that relating to the first 14 generations of imperial rulers. Although this view had been accepted by most scholars at the time it appeared, and had been circulating openly...
for decades, legal steps were taken in 1939 to ban the books and put their author on trial. For the full trial records, see *Gendai-shi Shiryō* [Source Materials on Modern History], vol.42, pp.353–1089; for more information on the trial, see Tam Yuntai, “Rationalism vs nationalism: Tsuda Sokichi (1873–1961),” in *History in the Service of the Japanese Nation*, ed. John Brownlee (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1983; Publication Series vol.2, no.2); see also see tenaga, *Tsuda Sokichi no sbisō-shi-teki kenkyū*, pp.455–532; Minobe Ryōkichi, *Kumon suru demokurashii* [Democracy in Agony] (Tokyo: Bun'gei shunju shinsha, 1959), ch.6, pp.175–200, among others.

Tsuda denies this: he considered the whole affair to be a “misunderstanding” 誤解. See for instance, “Watashi no kiki no kenkyu no shushi” [The Gist of My Research on Myths], in *Rokishi kyōiku* 5.7 (1959); also see *TSZ*, vol.20, pp.336–46.


This does not represent the whole picture, however, for it cannot explain why the trial ended as it did: Tsuda was found guilty of only one out of the nine charges, and his conviction was nullified because of an appeal that was never carried through. Were the charges pressed against Tsuda concerning his blasphemous research on the imperial mythology simply a pretext? It is very hard to establish that it was, and that other forces were working behind the scenes for very different reasons. I believe, however, that it is not impossible (indeed it is even probable) that Tsuda’s views on the imperial institution were an important part of the reason, but not the whole reason, for his prosecution.

Looking at the circumstances of the trial, at comments by participants and at its outcome, it seems that his view on China played an important role as well. In this, there was his reluctance concerning the dominant ultranationalist ideology, and the bad timing of his giving vent to it. Not only his publications but also the lectures he gave at Tokyo University drew the attention of ultranationalist activists shortly after the shelving of Minobe Tatsukichi’s 美濃部達吉 “emperor-as-an-organ-of-the-State” theory (1935)—which put an end to the ‘constitutional’ legacy of Taisho—and the outbreak of full-scale conflict in China (1937). There was also a matter of the politics involved. One of the political roles of the emperor mentioned in the Meiji Constitution, to which the military appealed with increasing insistence as their power was augmented, was the *tōsuiken* 統帥権, that is the direct command of emperor over the military, without the interference of government, let alone parliament (as stipulated in Article 11). As a mechanism that clearly implicated the emperor in politics and military campaigning, the notion of direct command was discredited by Tsuda’s research as being in conflict with Japanese historical practice. Tsuda’s works showed the emperor to be an apolitical, cultural and almost pacifist symbol. He even called the Meiji Restoration a “gangsters’ plot”, and seemed to favor the Edo constellation of shogunal power and the emperor as a spiritual authority—a stance that flew in the face of a text such as the Imperial Rescript for the Military of 1887, which labeled the Edo...
power constellation a “flawed situation” (shittai 失態).

Applying both of Tsuda's viewpoints to the situation on the mainland at that time could only lead to the conclusion that the military had dramatically misjudged the historical situation; therefore Tsuda was resolutely 'purged.' It is now known that those who took action in and out of parliament against Minobe in 1935 were backed by the Military Reservist Association, 94 and there is little reason to believe that this group would let Tsuda off the hook. After his lecture at Tokyo University he was accused of “grand treason” in a questionable journal article by the same person who had played a considerable part in the ousting of Minobe. By that time, standard legal interpretations of the Constitutional stipulation that “freedom of speech is guaranteed, within the limits of the law” (Article 29) had been complemented in such a manner (the Peace Preservation Law of 1925, for instance) that alternative opinions or challenging voices were easily suppressed. Tsuda was up against the constitution itself in some way, against its first articles and the “supreme command” prerogative—a fact that he was not willing to accept, even after the war. He considered his indictment a misunderstanding and joined other pre-war liberals (such as Minobe Tatsukichi) in their post-war view that the distortion of the Constitution by militarism had been coincidental or generic and not essential. 95

It had not always been the state that took the initiative in redefining national goals. It cannot be denied, however, that the state incorporated, supported, or more or less condoned those groups that advocated national pride and strength by stressing the supposedly unchanging certainties of culture, tradition and historical destiny. At the same time, it violently crushed alternative views, specifically left-wing or openly religiously-defined ones. 96 As a result, it unleashed the upsurge of a discourse that did not allow for any doubt to be cast on the nature of that political-cultural structure that was the ultimate safeguard of national unity: the imperial tradition. Views that blindly revered this tradition were given every chance to thrive, while views opposing it were thwarted. It seems as if the huge disruptions caused by social and economic changes within Japan could no longer be explained in terms of ‘within’ the Meiji-Taishō consensus on the necessity to civilize, industrialize and colonize. On the need to invade Manchuria, and to subdue China through an open and eventually total conflict, there was far less consent. In that respect the harking back to culturalism is not to be considered exceptional; rather, it is a universal phenomenon of imperial expansion and its justification, which is politically and not culturally defined.

The Decline of Tsuda's Research on China: Post-war Developments

Strangely enough, despite Tsuda's increased fame after the trial, not

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95 As in Frank O. Miller, Minobe Tatsukichi interpreter of constitutionalism in Japan (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1965), pp.254-89.
Tsuda’s 1925 article on Confucianism and Taoism was translated into Chinese. See Li Jihuang, *Ru Dao liang jia guanxi tun* [On the Relationship Between Confucianism and Taoism] (Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1933), p.71. In the text, the word ‘Shina’ in the Japanese original has been translated into Chinese as ‘Zhongguo’ but the translation of Tsuda’s sometimes quite uncharitable comments on Chinese tradition are true to the original version. Also, Wang Guowei starts the 14th section of his 1921 *Guantang jilin* [The Collection of the Hall of Observation] (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1959, p.1) with a reference to Tsuda’s 1915 paper “Considerations on the Shi Wei” [*Shi Wei kao* 講義], TZS, vol.12, pp.43-56.

See the first part of “Shina shiso to Nihon” [Chinese Thought and Japan], TZS, vol.28, pp.200-69, on the Japanese reception of Chinese thought.

Joël Joos

much of his pre-war writing on China found its way into the post-war intellectual world. Some possible reasons are: first, the way in which Tsuda presented his views on Chinese intellectual tradition; second, his refusal to think in terms that were if not compatible with, then at least relatable to the Marxist discourse of history that was so dominant in post-war Japan; and third, his refusal to acknowledge the founding of the People’s Republic of China as an event of historical importance (in other words, his opposition to communism—particularly in an Asian context).

The first element can be put in simple terms. Although Tsuda went to great lengths to apply a textual and ‘positivistic’ method to the Chinese classics, just as he had done with the Japanese ancient texts, he could not conceal his strongly held ideas on the role China had played in Japanese intellectual history. He completely overlooked recent developments in China, such as the rise of nationalism and communism, the gradual permeation of modern ideas into politics and scholarship, and the fact that there was in China a certain attention towards Japan (and even towards Tsuda’s own works). It would be wrong to say that Tsuda was an anti-Chinese pamphleteer who wrote in favor of war in and on China. On the contrary, before the war Tsuda had considered the Chinese conflict as a hopeless case for Japan (though he did not give voice to this view too openly). This did not mean, however, that his objectivistic stance was without political implications, domestically as well as internationally. In the modernized context of post-Meiji society (as in any other) it was no longer up to scholarship to decide if a statement had political meaning. And in the highly politicized context of the Fifteen Years’ War in particular, any opinion on China was bound to have political ramifications, just as under the emperor-system any opinion on the emperor, however neutral it professed to be, had political implications. Furthermore, Tsuda’s objectivism was not as consistent as may be assumed. Almost without exception, the texts on any aspect of Chinese intellectual tradition that he produced contained at least a few sentences referring to the Chinese tradition as a “negative legacy” that was preventing present-day China from becoming a nation—cultural traits that had impinged upon people to the extent of undermining any workable sense of public interest, practical thought, national unity, social harmony, historical change and so on. For Tsuda, the worst thing was that the Chinese, being the way they were and being blindly chauvinistic about it, had polluted the minds of dozens of generations of Japanese intellectuals, burdening Japan with a complicated writing system, an array of impractical thought and empty rituals, and—the crowning horror—a lingering sense of inferiority toward China and the outside world.

The second reason for the post-war difficulty in convincing contemporary scholars of the lasting validity of his views was (as noted) that Tsuda refused to incorporate any “historical materialist” elements in his interpretations. To some extent, he did realize that “the people” (and not the leaders, heroes and officials) were to be placed at the center of historical consideration, as
his most famous work on national literature shows, though in his schema leaders and people were not put in opposition to each other. Tsuda was known to have been weary of Marxist scholarship (which he considered to be a contradiction) even before the war, but his ordeal under the ultranationalist yoke created the expectation of collaboration, or at the very least mutual tolerance. In fact neither of these occurred. With an outspokenness that was not present in his pre-war writing, Tsuda utterly rejected Marxism, stating (or expatiating) that its historical categories were corrupt, its abstractions unworkable and its claims about scientific basis and popular will a sham.99

Marxist historiographers such as Ishimoda Shô 石母田正, Tôma Seita 藤間生太 or Hani Gorô 羽仁五郎 soon realized that Tsuda was not an ally but an opponent—and one to be feared at that, because his previous experiences lent moral weight to his words and hence a convincing quality that highly theoretical debates on, say, early-capitalist economic history could not easily have matched. By the early 1950s, however, the post-war intellectual scene was dominated by these Marxist scholars, who in turn produced many notable works on Japanese and Chinese history. Any attempt to seal himself off from historical materialism would consign a scholar to the periphery of ongoing debates.

Tsuda’s conservatism went even further than ‘anti-leftism’ alone, however. One of his pet subjects after the war was language, language reform and the proper spelling of Japanese words. His stance was remarkable, and not because of his opposition to the _kana_ reforms (some reform proposals were actually dropped, after which the version for which Tsuda had argued was adopted). Tsuda’s position was exceptional because he insisted that the use of Chinese characters was a burden to the Japanese, and that—to start with—their use for Japanese proper names should be discontinued in favour of _katakana_. Tsuda put his own ideas in practice, referring to people, cities and eras in _katakana_ instead of characters, signing his texts with his own name in _katakana_ and referring to China, even after the war, as ‘Shina’ in _katakana_.100

Tsuda had grown old, and his work had been overtaken by other research that was newer and had sturdier theoretical foundations. If he acquired a readership after the war, it seems to have been on the fringes of accepted scholarship and tended to be within the conservative establishment or in broad, mainstream publications, addressing readerships who were not very interested in the theoretical premises and consequences of his oeuvre in general.

The third reason for Tsuda’s post-war decline brings together the two other reasons already mentioned. In theory, the accomplishing of what few had correctly predicted and many more had feared—that is the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949—might have been a shock to Tsuda. It seemed to many that China had finally managed to overcome its past and had started along the path of building a nation, in an age when socialism seemed a valid option to achieve these goals. Things worked out differently, however.

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100 Most of these documents were included in the 1961 compilation “Shisô, bungei, Nihongo” [Thought, Literary Arts, Japanese Language] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1961); they can also be found in _TSZ_, vol.21, esp. pp.1–88 (“Nihon-go zakkan” [Random Feelings About the Japanese Language]).
Tsuda did not believe that Chinese communism reflected any fundamental change in Chinese society; he did not think that it was ultimately a way of addressing traditional shortcomings in Chinese (intellectual) tradition, or that it constituted a step forward in any respect. Marxism, for Tsuda, was bad enough as it was, but in the hands of the Chinese it was appalling. The two did not cancel each other out; rather, they were mutually reinforcing. Symbolically, it was in the foreword to the re-edited volume of *Shina shisō to Nihon* in 1959 that Tsuda linked China and Marxism and made tortuous efforts to bring his point home. Only by making it seem as if the Revolution of 1949 did not constitute a break with the past could his 1938 (and earlier) argument that China was unable to change itself be maintained.\(^{101}\)

Tsuda did not hesitate to conflate Confucianism and communism together as the outcome of an absence of social awareness throughout Chinese tradition. As Tsuda saw it, the communists in China had a great interest in the idea of shared civilization between Japan and China; he argued that stressing the perceived commonality of the two cultures was a tool used by the Communists to prepare a revolution, following the Chinese model, in Japan. The communists had an agenda: they wished to exploit any existing ‘delusions’ of shared civilization in Japan, where (Tsuda contended) a partial importation of cultural artifacts was mistaken for complete cultural dependence and thought was mistaken for real life.

Tsuda’s anti-communism was not a product of the post-war era; but the post-war era provided the opportunity, and the targets, for him to give vent to his opinions. We can assume that the humiliating experience of having to recognize China as one of the victor nations at the Tokyo trials,\(^{102}\) the rise of the communist tide on a world scale, and the prominence of the Japanese Left in the academic world together provided a fertile environment for Tsuda’s resentments to be fed and intensified.

While his stance clearly contrasts with that of many China scholars of the day,\(^{103}\) Tsuda never engaged in direct exchanges with such people as Ishida Mikinosuke 石田幹之助, Haneda Tōru 羽田亨 or Takeuchi Yoshio 武内義雄. In terms of career as well as scholarly stance, he diverged greatly from many of his contemporaries. Two remarkable examples of this divergence occurred with the influential advocate of friendly relations with post-war China, Hirano Yoshitarō 平野義太郎 (1897–1980) and the foremost authority—in intellectual terms—on post-war China, Takeuchi Yoshimi 竹内好 (1910–77). Hirano, originally a legal scholar, had been a Marxist before the war, became involved in activities supporting the Co-Prosperity Sphere idea during the war, and turned into a pacifist after it, striving towards a settlement with China. Tsuda took a diametrically opposed position in all three periods (to which we should add that he was far less volatile than Hirano when it came to politics).

Even more interesting is the contrast between Tsuda and Takeuchi Yoshimi.
Takeuchi took his first noted steps in the field of Chinese (literary) studies in the second half of the 1930s, was a staunch believer in the essential value of 'the Orient' and felt very much involved in the fate of twentieth-century China. Tsuda takes precisely the opposite position as regards all three elements: he started his study of (ancient) China before the end of the Meiji period, was a persistent critic of the idea of 'the Orient' or any alternative form of Asianism, and harboured an extreme pessimism about modern China's political developments. While Takeuchi greatly valued Chinese resistance (teikō 抵抗) against the onslaught of Western values (a conscious and constructive resistance exemplified in the works of Lu Xun 魯迅) and accused Japan of being a nation of spineless adherents to Western modernity, Tsuda made no attempt to veil his condescension towards the Chinese people and their ordeals, saw no progress in China, and regarded Japan as a teacher of China in terms not only of ability to learn but also of universal values and strength. No record has yet been found of Tsuda engaging with the tenets held by Takeuchi, either directly or indirectly.

Together, Hirano, Takeuchi and Tsuda form an ideological triangle, each point representing a different view on the ideals and reality of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. Hirano endorsed both the anti-imperialist ideals and the imperialist reality; Takeuchi rejected Japan's imperialism on the mainland while still believing in the possibility of a truly anti-imperialist solution tying Japan to the mainland in a constructive and not a destructive manner; and Tsuda rejected both the theory and the praxis of Japanese interference in China. Takeuchi took the trouble to point out the relentless alteration in Hirano's attitude toward China in a critical way, of course—but did not address Tsuda, whose utter lack of idealism put him at the other extreme of the spectrum as far as 'the Orient' is concerned.

Last but not least, Tsuda did not show any sign of concern for the ordeals of the Koreans, even during the Korean War. In a 1953 article, he argued that the annexation of Korea by Japan was the outcome of a historical process and of the 'particular psyche' of the Koreans which threatened international stability—in short, the product of their "bad habit" (shūbeki 習癖) of "pursuing the interest of their own country alone."105

Conclusion

Caution is required in evaluating Tsuda's contribution to scholarship on China. His grim depiction of Chinese thought and society was not meant as a rationale for the submission of China as such. There are passages in his texts that reveal a (perhaps patronizing) wish for the Chinese to overcome their shortcomings, and that lament the simplistic racism of many supporters of military expansion on the mainland. The China that Tsuda had in mind


105 "Futatabi rekishi kyōiku nitsute" [On History Education Again], TSZ, vol.20, p.464 (the article was first published in the widely read magazine Chūō Kōron [Central Review] 588 (July 1953)). In "Genka no seshō to Nihonjin no taido" [How the World Looks Today and the Attitude of the Japanese], in Chūō Kōron (July 1948), he laments the weak-kneed attitude of the government vis-à-vis Koreans in Japan, seeing this as the main reason for the "uproar" sawagi騒ぎ they caused (probably referring to the uprising against the decision to close down Korean schools on 24 April 1948). See TSZ, vol.23, p.213.
when pointing to its enormous flaws was the boastful China of the Classics; the China that Japanese Confucianists used to worship as the country of sages, wisdom and courtesy; the China that had loomed over Japan as the eternal center, confining Japan to a barbaric periphery. Nonetheless, by attacking the idealized model of ancient China that 'sinophilic' scholars of the Edo period had embraced and that lived on surreptitiously in the Confucianist preferences of Meiji conservatives, Tsuda unwittingly took over their perception of distance between China and Japan, and failed to notice that before long his depiction had lapsed into a caricature. The question remains as to how far his depiction of Japan withstood this duality. As far as 'ulterior motives' are concerned, Tsuda related continental intellectual tradition to Japan in an antithetical manner; every negative comment on China seemed to resonate with a positive one about Japan. This does not mean that Tsuda did not make any serious contribution to the field, however, or that he failed to give any serious reasons for turning to the study of China. As well as being a means to guide Japan out of its traditional cultural servility vis-à-vis China, he considered it an academic challenge and a way to inform Westerners about the fundamental difference between the two countries. As the only nation in Asia that had been able to modernize itself and had shown the capacity to participate in world culture, Japan could play a guiding role in both directions. Japanese anger about Japan not being taken seriously was directed against China rather than the West; only if China could realize that Japan was a more advanced and more developed nation, which had partaken in world culture (a term Tsuda questioned only in his post-war work, when "world culture" came threateningly close), would it be able to climb out of its desperate situation.

After the war, Tsuda did not go into details about constitutional change, and he referred to his indictment as a misunderstanding (generic and not essential). In doing so he failed to grasp the motives of his enemies, and glossed over the fact that his views on China had had a specific significance in the pre-war era, in which the underlying stress on pre-modern values (from which Chinese or China-oriented concepts cannot be excluded) had played such a major part. The same view made him impervious to post-war self-criticism. A touch of tragedy can be found in the 'predicament' of the post-war Tsuda, when confronted with the continual condemnation of Japan's pre-modern legacy. His resentment must have resembled that of Chinese scholars in the first half of the twentieth century when confronted with (amongst others) Tsuda's condemnation of China's intellectual tradition in exactly the same terms. Perhaps even more tragic was the fact that Tsuda remained unaware of this tragedy till his dying days.