CONTENTS

1 Editor's note
   Benjamin Penny

3 Manchukuo's Filial Sons: States, Sects and the Adaptation of Graveside Piety
   Thomas David DuBois

29 New Symbolism and Retail Therapy: Advertising Novelties in Korea's Colonial Period
   Roald Maliangkay

55 Landscape's Mediation Between History and Memory: A Revisualization of Japan's (War-Time) Past
   Julia Adeney Thomas

73 The Big Red Dragon and Indigenizations of Christianity in China
   Emily Dunn
Cover calligraphy Yan Zhenqing 顔真卿, Tang calligrapher and statesman

Cover image O Chi-ho 呉之湖, South-Facing House (Minamimuki no ie 南向の家), 1939. Oil on canvas, 79 x 64 cm. Collection of the National Museum of Modern Art, Korea
On October 23, 1938, Li Zhongsan 李中三, known better as Filial Son Li (Li Xiaozhe 李孝子), emerged from the hut in which he had lived for three years while keeping watch over his mother’s grave. During his vigil—a custom called shou mu 守墓—the grave in rural Jiutai 九台 county of central Jilin 吉林 province had become known as a “filial tomb” (xiaozi fen 孝子坟), one of a handful that sprouted up in the heartland of the Japanese-sponsored state of Manchukuo 滿洲国. Each day, hundreds of pilgrims from throughout Manchuria visited the tomb to pray, burn incense, and take back handfuls of earth for its reputed spiritual power. When Li did end his prescribed period of mourning, the occasion was marked by a formal Confucian ritual, attended by thousands, and presided over by a number of Manchukuo’s political luminaries.

At first glance, this story seems less than remarkable. Graveside piety had long been an important part of Chinese mourning practice, and for centuries the imperial Chinese state had extended its support and recognition to such expressions of filial devotion. Even as many in Republican China were turning their backs on Confucian tradition, the Manchukuo government spared no effort in portraying itself as the champion of a Confucian revival. The new state had invested heavily in the ideals and trappings of Confucian ritual, and it is easy to imagine that they might have wished to bask in the ambient glow of even somewhat extreme customs such as the mourning regimen of filial sons.

However, Manchukuo’s filial tombs reveal something rather more complex than simple state appropriation or manipulation of popular custom. For one, although it is often characterized as a simple puppet of Japanese
imperialism, the Manchukuo state was in fact a complex network of ideals and interests. On the whole, neither the Manchukuo government nor its Japanese officials actively encouraged extreme practices such as filial vigils, nor the transformation of these graves into sacred sites. Rather, it was its stratum of Chinese officials, in particular those who had ties to certain new religious organizations, who supported the sites with money and public prestige. Moreover, these Chinese elites did not create the custom of graveside vigils, they merely adopted a custom that already existed and was spreading on its own. The filial sons themselves entered their vigils voluntarily, and for a variety of different reasons. The relatively weak influence of Manchukuo officialdom over the proliferation of filial tombs explains their unorthodox nature: the departures from traditional Confucian mourning practice, as well as the very un-Confucian vows, prayers, healing, and tales of divine efficacy that would characterize any Chinese sacred site. It also explains how the tombs were able to survive the fall of Manchukuo, and why they were tolerated well into the 1950s (and in some cases later). Taken together, the story of filial tombs before, during and after the existence of Manchukuo reveals the density of commercial, political and devotional interests that develop around religious practice, in which the state is only one voice, and even then rarely a unified one. Finally, as further proof that history never really dies, these same debates have been to some degree reconstituted in a recent proposal by the Changchun Department of Tourism (Changchun shi luyou ju 長春市旅游局) to reconstruct a filial tomb as part of their planned Chinese Filial Virtue Culture Park (Zhonghua xiaoxian wenhua yuan 中华孝贤文化园).

Background

For centuries, the Chinese imperial institution was largely inseparable from Confucian ethics and ritual. As early as the Han 漢 dynasty (206BC–AD220), Confucian thought came to eclipse rival schools of statecraft as the official orthodoxy of the empire, a status that was later augmented by the numerous laudatory titles conferred posthumously upon Confucius himself, and later still, by a system of civil service examinations that recruited officials based on their knowledge of the Confucian classics and commentaries. Possibly the most sweeping expansion
of state support for Confucianism was instituted in the later fourteenth century by the first Ming emperor, Zhu Yuanzhang (r. 1369–1398), who, among much else, penned commentaries on good governance (such as the 1375 “Instructions to Save the World” Zishi tongxun 資世通訓), paid for the distribution of morality tracts out of state coffers, and wrote the rules of proper mourning practices into state law. Like much else from the early Ming, this level of state support for Confucianism remained in place until the end of the imperial system in 1911.

The early twentieth century presented widely divergent views of the role Confucianism would play in the post-imperial order. Given its association with the moribund Qing dynasty and failings of the early Republic, it is perhaps little surprise that Confucianism was pilloried by political and social reformers, most notably in the May Fourth Movement of the late teens and twenties. Confucian tradition, reformers argued, had caused the Chinese people to value empty ritual form over real function, filled them with boastful xenophobia, gave rise to all manner of graft and corruption, and generally made China unable to cope with the modern world. This iconoclastic trend again reversed during the 1930s, with Chiang Kai-shek’s consolidation of power, and the urgent need for a social reformation to counter a variety of looming crises. The answer was Confucian revival. In 1934, Chiang officially launched the New Life Movement (Xin shenghuo yundong 新生活運動), a campaign that was famously termed “Confucian fascism” by Lloyd Eastman, and emphasized 96 seemingly trivial points of personal hygiene and etiquette. Yet, as Jennifer Oldstone-Moore reminds us, such an approach is entirely compatible with the Confucian emphasis on proper behavior. As a bulwark against Japanese aggression, and particularly against the advancing spiritual rot of Communism, Chiang sought to reinvigorate traditional Confucian values, to transform the Chinese nation by reweaving the moral fabric of the daily life.

Not coincidentally, although the threat from Japan was at least partially responsible for Chiang’s attempt to promote his paternalistic Confucian revival, the Japanese client state of Manchukuo, which was formed in 1932, portrayed itself as the true champion of modern Confucianism, and went to even greater lengths than the Republic to identify itself with precisely this same tradition. Most visibly, these efforts involved the reinstatement of the deposed emperor Pu Yi 溥儀 (1906–67) (for whom a retired scholar was retained to deliver weekly lectures on Confucian classics) as head of state, as well as a liberal dose of rhetoric evoking the Confucian ideal of moral governance known as the “Kingly Way” (wang dao 王道). It also involved the revival of other tactics culled directly from the imperial playbook, some of which directly foreshadowed the cult of filial tombs. The first of these was the policy of recognizing and commending moral exemplars from among the populace. Beginning in 1934, provincial gov-

---


The second was the creation of a national network of temples, which established a physical and ritual presence of the state in local society. This process had actually begun much earlier, with the construction of Shinto shrines and monuments to the war dead throughout Manchuria during the years following the Russo-Japanese War. By the 1930s, such shrines had become a feature of nearly every city in Manchuria, but existed primarily for the convenience and inspiration of the resident Japanese. When a more inclusive religion was needed for Manchukuo, it would be state-led Confucianism, prompting the construction of a similar network of sacred sites. Again in emulation of a defunct imperial practice, each province, district and administrative city was ordered in 1934 to build and maintain a Confucian temple. These same laws also called for the revival of the imperial-era ritual regimen. Each Confucian temple was to host biannual Spring and Autumn sacrifices, with local officials presiding. By the close of the decade, these two types of temple networks had largely merged into parallel structures: Confucian temples were joined by shrines to the Shinto-inspired “Spirit of National Foundation” (jianguo shen 建國神), as well as by monuments to the “loyal spirits” (zhongling 忠靈), the dead of the ongoing “sacred battle” throughout Asia. By the early 1940s, every administrative center, market town and military garrison had some representation of these three expressions of official religiosity, in which
both Chinese and Japanese local officials presided over a regular regimen of rituals. Despite their apparent differences, each type of shrine performed essentially the same function, acting as a node in a hierarchically defined network of official ritual sites and activities, and along with them, maintaining a visible presence of state-centered religiosity throughout the nation.\(^6\)

Each of these developments: the pains taken to identify the Manchukuo state with Confucian revival, its policy of recognizing Confucian moral exemplars, and its construction of a network of state-sponsored religious sites, would seem to be eminently compatible with the cult of graveside piety. Indeed, it would have made very good sense for authorities to find some way to accommodate this custom. For centuries, graveside worship had been extremely common throughout northern China, and still remains deeply significant to local religious life. Not only moral exemplars, but also efficacious healers, sectarian teachers, and local military figures have all been known to inspire worship, centered on the grave as a sacred site.\(^7\) Such sites frequently become deeply integrated into local or more extensive cults. The grave of Yu Wu 于五, a late-Qing healer who lived and was buried in the Tianjin suburb of Yangliuqing 楊柳青, inspired the construction of the Precious Spreading Light Pagoda (Puliang baota 善亮寶塔) by members of the neighborhood committee, who frequently gather on the premises for votive and social activities. The grave of Liu Lisan 劉力三, who is credited with bringing the sectarian Heaven and Earth Teaching (Tiandimen jiao 天地門教) to rural Cang 滄縣 county, Hebei 河北, during the mid-nineteenth century, remains a place of special veneration for a nearby cluster of villages, in particular for the adherents of the

---

\(\text{Figure 3}
\)


---


\(^{8} \text{Interviews: Huimin 惠民 county, Shandong 江東, 14 February 1998; Cang county, Hebei 河北, 13 November 1997 and Huanghua 黃驊 county, Hebei, 11 April 1998.}

\(^{9} \text{Thomas David DuBois, } \textit{The Sacred Village: Social Change and Religious Life in Rural North China} \textit{(Honolulu: University of...}
teaching itself. Other members of the same teaching have inspired a broader base of worship. The grave of its founder, Dong Jisheng 董其升 (1619–50) had for three centuries attracted pilgrims to northern Shandong 山東, so much so that the local government had the tomb razed on more than one occasion. Back in Hebei, the grave of another Heaven and Earth teacher, known simply as Sister Zheng 姊姐, inspired the very public construction of a large three-room temple, and an annual festival that draws over fifty thousand pilgrims and fairgoers. 8

However, whatever the size or legality of a grave and its cult, the primary attraction of these particular sites is the magical power of a grave’s occupant. Members of the Heaven and Earth Teaching in Cang county will commemorate the birthday of Liu Lisan with a decorous ceremony at his grave, but few would think to visit it on other days, primarily because Liu has not developed a reputation for healing, granting wishes, protection, or any of the other needs people will bring to the sacred. The grave of Yu Wu, in contrast, is clearly a site of popular piety, its walls draped with layers of red cloth bearing the inscription “ask and you shall receive” (you qiu bi ying 有求必應). At the far extreme is the grave of Sister Zheng. Although Sister Zheng was herself a revered member of the Heaven and Earth Teaching, most who come to visit her sizeable tomb in Huanghua 黄驊 county know her better as a healer, and this is what they seek when they visit her grave. Far from decorous Confucian ritual, the thousands who visit this site each year do so to burn incense, make offerings and pray for the health of themselves and their loved ones.9

Moreover, even if the imperial state might have at times tolerated or ignored popular gravesite cults, it certainly did not promote them. Fundamental to the Confucian understanding of ritual was that it must be correct ritual, which improper mourning was certainly not. Generally speaking, the imperial state frowned upon excessive mourning for persons outside one’s own circle of prescribed relationships, particularly those outside one’s own family.10 At best, such behavior was considered an unbecoming distraction, at worst, it cheapened the significance of obliged ritual. Universalized piety was not encouraged—there was no Confucian corollary to the Buddhist practice of praying for all souls—and admiration for moral exemplars was never intended to lead to the type of worship seen at gravesites such as those of Yu Wu or Sister Zheng. Even taking
into account James Watson's famous statement on orthopraxy, that the imperial state was primarily interested in creating only the outward appearance of conformity, and was thus more concerned with policing visible behavior than internal belief, most of the activities associated with popular gravesite worship remain far outside the pale of acceptable practice.11

Finally, the manifestation of graveside piety in the worship of "filial tombs" itself represents something of a deviation even from more common mourning practice. Although in its original usage, the term "filial son" (xiaozi 孝子) often referred specifically to a son engaged in the three-year mourning vigil for a parent, the more common meaning is simply that of a son who exhibits an unusual degree of filial piety.12 This looser meaning is implied in the tale of one so-named "Filial Wang," recorded in the "illustrious personages" section of the 1891 Comprehensive Gazetteer of Jilin (Jilin tongzhi 吉林通誌). Although this Filial Wang shares the same honorific title as the hero of our own story below, he was not remembered for his filial vigil, but rather for the more prosaic virtues of supporting his aged mother with food and clothing.13 Nor do other Qing- and Republican-period gazetteers from the area (even those that are not shy about reporting questionable temples, practices or groups), mention filial tombs among their local religious sites, or extreme mourning practices among their local customs.14

At the same time, such practices would have been very familiar to contemporary observers. The tradition of mourning a parent for three years was already well established by the Han dynasty, and was written into law during the early years of the Ming, even if relatively few people had the willpower to live out the strict mourning regimen. Yet many did mourn for the full three years, and a very few even surpassed these harsh requirements. This tradition of "exceeding the rites", of extending the ritual requirements of filial piety to an extreme and often dangerous degree, was at once frowned upon and admired, and had developed as a literary theme since the time the ritual requirements themselves began to be codified. Perhaps the best-known expression of this tradition is the Yuan dynasty collection of stories known as the Twenty-four Exemplars of Filial Piety (Ershi si xiao 二十四孝), which depicts adult children serving their parents through such extreme acts as cooking their own flesh into medicine. Beyond this particular text, individual tales of especially sincere
A clear definition of a filial son with reference to ritual is in the *Book of Rites* (Liji 20, zui 禮記·雜記上第 20), which states that “when conducting ancestral sacrifices, a son or grandson is called filial, during the funeral ceremonies, he is called bereaved 哭稱 孝子 孝孫: 痛稱 哀子 哀孫”.

filial sons.

Very little is known about the life of Wang Mengxing 王夢惺. He was a Han Chinese who lived in the waning years of the Qing dynasty in Changchun, which at the time was a small town on the edge of Jilin province. Wang was by all accounts poor, most likely a peasant or tradesman, and probably an only child. Most accounts mention that Wang was raised by his mother, Madam Han 韓, his father having died while Wang was a child. Very little else can be said with any certainty. Some accounts claim that Wang spent some years of his adulthood in the Qianshan wuliang guan 千山無量觀 Daoist monastery in Liaoning 遼寧, but others omit this detail, and there is no particular reason to suspect that it is true or false. Many accounts neglect to mention even his name, referring to him simply by his post-mortem moniker of Filial Wang (Wang xiaozhi 王孝子).

The reason Filial Wang is remembered at all owes less to the circumstances of his life than to those of his death. Perhaps the only thing that can be said with certainty about Wang Mengxing is that he was deeply attached to his mother. In good Confucian fashion, she had raised her child in dignified poverty after his father’s death (any good Confucian would immediately recognize a parallel to the upbringing of the sage Mencius), and Wang repaid her kindness by caring for her in her old age. When she finally died in 1910, Wang was grief-stricken and kept a vigil over her grave for three years. Throughout his vigil, Wang lived on the edge of subsistence, sheltering in a straw hut, eating only raw rice, and developing a reputation both for piety, and also for spiritual power. At the end of the three years, weakened by grief and exposure, Wang himself died, and was interred next to his mother.

The grave of Wang Mengxing became known as the “filial tomb” (xiaozhi fen literally the “tomb of the filial son”), and gradually developed into something of a local landmark. A sizeable brick stupa was constructed atop the grave mound, and important political figures who passed through the area, including the warlord Wu Peifu 吳佩孚 (1874–1939), stopped to pay their respects to Wang Mengxing’s filial sacrifice, and leave a gift of their calligraphy. Yan Shiqing 順世清 (1873–1929), the Republican governor (daojuin 道尹) of Jilin and future president of the Beiyang government Cao Kun 曹堯 (1862–1938), built a commemorative arch at
Figure 5
Grave of Yu Wu 于五 in Yangliuqing 楊柳青.
Photograph by author

Figure 6
Festival at the grave of Sister Zheng 鄭姐.
Photograph by author
Beyond such expressions of respect for Wang, the site also developed a reputation for miraculous power. Already during his vigil, Wang had become known for his ability to heal, and after his death a steady stream of people continued to visit the grave for fortune telling, medicine and to make vows. The magical efficacy of the site may be one reason behind the claim that Wang had spent time in a Daoist monastery, where he presumably would have learned the arts that he took with him beyond the grave. The site manifested its power in other ways, as well. On one occasion when Wang and his mother were to be disinterred and moved to a new grave further from the town, it was revealed that the roots of the elm tree planted on top of the grave mound had reached down and bound the two bodies together. In the end, this was sufficient evidence of Filial Wang’s divine power at work to discourage the planned move.\textsuperscript{18}

The site received its greatest boost in 1932, with the founding of Manchukuo and redesignation of Changchun as the New Capital (Xinjing 新京). While old Changchun had been a smallish railway stop of no particular importance, Xinjing was destined to become the modern showcase of the new nation. Manchukuo authorities outlined an ambitious plan for Xinjing, which at the time consisted of a Chinese quarter, adjacent to a small but dense Japanese commercial district, more than doubling the size of the city and crisscrossing it with a grid of stately promenades. A wide new road, named Unification Road (Datong lu, later renamed as Stalin Road, and again as the Great Way of the People) was planned to run directly south from the railway station and bisect the city. The tomb of Filial Wang partially blocked the planned route of this central artery, and was scheduled for demolition.

The imminent destruction of his grave prompted Wang Mengxing to display his power in spectacular fashion. According to Jiao Yingtang, who at the time was a child living in an orphanage adjacent to the grave, Wang expressed his displeasure with a number of signs: the trees surrounding the grave began to bleed, and the workers themselves experienced headaches, mysterious pains and vomiting. One laborer who tried to dig under the grave began bleeding from the seven bodily orifices, and died on the spot. Soon workers refused to go to the site altogether. An attempt to destroy the grave with artillery was equally unsuccessful, with one shell flying to the right, another to the left, and one that hit square on the top bouncing off without exploding. These signs were enough to convince most observers, but just to make sure that the grave would be well and truly protected in the future, Wang reportedly appeared in a dream to the head of the Japanese General Headquarters, informing him of dire consequences—the destruction of country and family (guo po jia wang 国破家亡)—were the grave to be harmed.
The grave was indeed preserved and, buoyed by these stories of spiritual efficacy and a new burst of respectability, became a major attraction. Physically, the site was made more formal and imposing, and enhanced with a fence and stone staircase. The road was indeed made to curve slightly and avoid the grave, a visible reminder of its power and importance. Collections of postcards from Xinjing include the grave along with other important sites, such as the city’s Shinto shrine and Buddhist Ban’’ou Monastery. Beyond its cultural attraction, the site continued to enjoy a reputation for spiritual efficacy. A postcard from the period shows the stupa covered in signs, including one in which the inscription “ask and you shall receive”, the typical expression of thanks for a prayer answered, is clearly visible.

The grave attracted a variety of worshippers. Jiao remembers most being old, and noted that many arrived in something of a holiday mood—visiting the site to relax and socialize in the quiet, tree-lined surroundings of adjacent Peony Park (Mudan gongyuan). Others were more serious, visiting to pray or make votive offerings. One Auntie Dan, an elderly woman who used to mend clothes for the orphans, frequented the grave to recite scriptures, and often left carrying a vial of blessed water or a black ball of medicine, a testament to the continued association between the tomb and healing. Clearly Auntie Dan had few other places to go: when she died, her body was kept at the orphanage, and she was eventually buried without a coffin. On one occasion that particularly affected the young viewer, a half-starved beggar, walking with a limp and appearing as though he had been beaten, came to make offerings of fruit and steamed bread (mantou) at the shrine. After some time, a young man emerged from the crowd and escorted the beggar to a hospital.

A Daoist temple located adjacent to the tomb provided the site with its unofficial custodians. Although the temple and the grave were separate entities, in practice the handful of resident priests took custodial care over the site, and received its more important pilgrims. On special occasions,
Figure 8

Construction of Unification Road, with the Tomb of Filial Wang in the foreground. From Yu Xionglan and Li Zhiji, *Modern Architecture of Changchun* (Changchun jindai jianzhu 長春近代建築) (Changchun: Changchun chubanshe, 2001). Reproduced by permission of publisher.

Figure 9

Japanese postcard, showing the Tomb of the Filial Son. My sincere thanks to Zhang Yang 張楊 and Yu Qun 于群 for helping me to locate this rare item.
such as the Lunar New Year, the Daoists would perform a solemn ceremony at the tomb and distribute charms (fu 符) and medicine to large crowds of faithful.

Such occasions also demonstrate the limited support of the state for the tomb and its activities. Owing to its public association with Manchukuo, it is easy to assume that the tomb was, like Shinto rituals or shrines to the war dead, part of a program of ideological pacification engineered by traitors who, in the words of one Chinese historian, "spoke the name of filial piety in order to betray their country." Certain the willingness of authorities to alter the route of Unification Road in order to preserve the tomb demonstrates a great deal of sympathy on the part of the state for what the site represented. The feeling would appear to have been mutual: walls and trees around the grave were often hung with banners proclaiming Manchuku-Japanese friendship. Yet official support was not unconditional. In contrast to their very public role in the state calendar of Shinto and Confucian rites, Japanese members of the government were conspicuously absent from the ritual activities of the Filial Tomb. Similarly, although the grave was touted as a tourist destination, it was rarely mentioned in the Japanese-controlled press. This silence stands in contrast to the frequent and sympathetic reportage given to occasions such as Shinto rites, or the annual Spring and Autumn sacrifices held at Confucian temples.

On the other hand, many Chinese officials of the Manchukuo government were actively and visibly involved in the ritual life of tomb. At one particularly large ceremony in 1941, the names of sponsors painted on a specially prepared stele read like a Who's Who of the Manchukuo Chinese elite, beginning with Prime Minister Zhang Jinghui 張景惠, followed by other political figures Zhang Haipeng 張海鵬, Zang Shiyi 蕭式毅, and Yu Zhishan 于芷山. The patronage of these individuals is notable, due to their prominence not merely within the Manchukuo government, but also in an organization called the Red Swastika Society (Hongwanzi hui 紅卍字會). Each of these signatories was a member of the society, and Zhang Haipeng was its national head. The tomb itself, not coincidentally, was located adjacent to the national headquarters of the Red Swastika Society at the intersection of Unification and Great Benevolence (Xingren 興仁) Roads.

The Red Swastika Society itself predated Manchukuo by less than a decade. It originated in the Daoyuan 道院, a religious teaching founded in Shandong in 1921. Daoyuan was one of many new teachings that marked a resurgence of the tradition known broadly (albeit somewhat incorrectly) as White Lotus sectarianism. Like its predecessors, Daoyuan employed spirit writing, and freely combined veneration of the Buddha, Confucius, Laozi, Mohammed and the Virgin Mary, as well as a pantheon of popular deities. However, while earlier teachings of this type had been forced underground, those dating from the early twentieth century
Existing teachings, such as the Way of Penetrating Unity (Yigian dian — 贯道) and the Li Sect (Zailijiao 在理教) also began to spread aggressively during the early twentieth century. See DuBois, The Sacred Village, pp.106–151.


Like the Way of Penetrating Unity, the Red Swastika Society routinely employed spirit writing as the source of scriptures. This was the origin of its main scripture, the True Scripture of the Ultimate Polestar (Tānyī hengjī zhēn jīng 太乙極真經), as well as many that followed it. One possible comparison might be with the life of the Red Swastika Society, or the Morality Teaching (De jiao 德敎) in modern Hong Kong, Malaysia or Singapore. Both teachings base their public profile around charitable works, such as free clinics and homes for the aged, but tend to restrict their religious message and identity to insiders. For a recent example, see Bernard Fosomo, “A Wishful Thinking Claim to Global Expansion? The Case of De jiao,” ARI Working Papers Series 96, <http://www.ari.nus.edu.sg/showfile.asp?pubid=684&rype=2>, viewed 15 October 2007.


Shao Yong, Zhongguo huidaomen, pp.319–20.

Hao Youquan, “Pu Yi he Hongwanzi zonghui” [Pu Yi and the Head Branch of the Red Swastika Society] Changchun/Over tended to be more open, and even aggressive in promoting their public image as a new form of civic Confucianism, and providing public relief in the absence of government services. As the need for relief grew, the Daoyuan created the Red Swastika Society as a devoted charitable arm. The Red Swastika Society was thus affiliated with the Daoyuan, but ideally was to remain independent of it, thus remaining (according to its own somewhat grandiose description) “an organization that transcendents and transcends government.” Groups like the Daoyuan-Red Swastika Society were indeed new: Prasenjit Duara underscores this difference when he refers to such groups not as sectarians, but rather as “lay redemptive societies.” However, this new civic identity should not lead us to forget that the Red Swastika Society was at its core a deeply religious organization. The Society remained deeply concerned with ritual, and penned a scriptural tradition that links them more clearly to their sectarian roots than their charitable emphasis might suggest. There is even some reason to suggest that the custom of filial vigils, as it developed in Changchun, was uniquely attractive to Confucian revivalist groups such as the Red Swastika Society. Wu Peifu, who visited the site long before Manchukuo had appeared on the horizon, was himself a member of the society. To reinvigorate Confucian morals in society, Daoyuan encouraged its members to observe the three years of ritual mourning for a parent, albeit not in the harsh circumstances of Filial Wang.

The Red Swastika Society spread quickly into Manchuria during the late 1920s. The earliest branch was founded in Shenyang in 1922, followed by steady expansion over the next few years. During this time, the society became known for its pro-Japanese stance, and according to some accounts, actively supported the independence of Manchuria and Mongolia from the Chinese Republic. Not surprisingly, its greatest boost came after the founding of Manchuko. The movement remained active in its support for the state, forming a breakaway Manchuko Red Swastika Society in 1936, and sending public congratulatory messages to the government on important occasions. The feeling seemed to be mutual. Manchuko newspapers, which by this point were clearly under state control, tended to portray the group quite kindly, giving generous coverage to its many charitable activities. In addition to the strong support the society enjoyed among Chinese members of the new government, it also developed a wide popular following during these years. In 1934 (the year that Pu Yi ascended the throne as the Kangde Emperor) and 1935, the number of branches in Manchuria nearly doubled, increasing from 39 to 76. Nationwide membership continued to grow as well, from 5,131 in 1939 to 13,954 in 1942, with revenues nearly tripling in a similar period.

Nevertheless, like the tomb of Filial Wang itself, the Red Swastika Society was a discrete organization operating with state approval, rather than a mass movement supported by it. Based on its vocal support for
Manchurian independence during the 1920s, and subsequent ties to the Manchukuo government, scholars in China frequently conclude that groups like the Red Swastika Society were under the direct control of Japan. I doubt that this is strictly true, and suspect rather that the affection the society demonstrated for Manchukuo reflected less its control by the state than an attempt by the society to ingratiate itself to authorities that remained suspicious of it. Such a strategy is similar to that adopted by contemporary Japanese religious movements of questionable legality, such as Ōmotokyo 大本教, and of other Chinese religions that prospered under the occupation, such as the Way of Penetrating Unity. What can be said for certain is that, flattering newspaper portrayals aside, the Red Swastika Society never received sustained institutional support from Manchukuo or Japan. Despite the enthusiastic patronage of many high-ranking Chinese members of the government, there always remained some distance between the society and the Manchukuo state. Like the Filial Tomb itself, it would be a great exaggeration to place its patrons in the Red Swastika Society on the same level as state Confucianism, in terms of official patronage.

**Filial Li**

A second filial tomb, located about 45 kilometers away in the village of Rongjia wanzi 榆家灣子 (currently Lujia cun 陆家村) in the Yinmahe 欣馬河 district of Jiutai county, was directly inspired by the Xinjing tomb of Filial Wang, but was in many ways distinct from it. This tomb was of a more recent vintage, and was not the resting place of a filial son, but rather one in which a son was keeping vigil over the grave of a parent. This allowed Li to take a more active role in the economic development of the site, even as Manchukuo officials and pilgrims continued to visit it for their own purposes.

Events were set in motion in 1935, with the death of a female leader of a group called the Morality Society (Daode hui 道德會). Soon after her funeral and interment just outside Rongjia wanzi, another Morality Society teacher, named Li Zhongsan, hailing from nearby Yushu 榆树林 county, arrived on the scene. Although Li was unknown to those assembled, he insisted that the deceased was his mother, and demanded to be taken to
her grave. These dramatic developments prompted an assembly of the local Morality Society chapter, with over a hundred in attendance, including members such as Sun Qichang 孫其昌 (1884–1954) and Feng Hanqing 馮瀚淸, who were also prominent figures in the Manchukuo government. The village head, Qin Zhongyuan 秦中原, set the solemn tone for the meeting by delivering a long speech about the importance of filial behavior, to which Li Zhongsan responded by kneeling before Qin and decrying his own lack of virtue.

In the end, the assembled members were convinced by Li’s reaction, and allowed him to take up residence in a straw hut near the grave, where he announced his intention to keep filial vigil over the site for the customary three years. Soon after, his wife, brothers and sisters also came to join him in Rongjia wanzi. He found no lack of local support: neighboring villagers provided Li with food and daily necessities, and the local government posted notices warning nearby peasants and shepherds not to bother him with excessive noise.

People did visit, however, as pilgrims. Like they had at the grave of Filial Wang, pilgrims came to pray and burn incense, and in particular to be healed. Li himself was the center of activity, presiding over the crowd of worshippers, and doling out handfuls of earth from the grave for sale as medicine. As the vigil demanded, Li almost never spoke, and would communicate only in writing. Li’s calligraphy was also offered for sale, and he was known for his ability to write simultaneously with his left and right hands. And there was no shortage of buyers. Every morning, the eight o’clock train from Xinjing stopped at the Yinmahe station, and from there, all manner of sick and crippled people would make their way, by horse, by cart or on foot (many of those who could walk doing so in expressions of votive penitence, stopping every few paces to bow or kneel), to the grave. On an ordinary day, roughly two hundred people might visit; on special occasions, the number could be much higher. In addition to the pilgrims, the popularity of the site attracted various support industries, providers of transportation from the station to the gravesite, as well as restaurants, opium houses, inns, and purveyors of flowers, paper, and other votive goods.33

As with the tomb of Filial Wang, there was a Chinese religious organization at the heart of the cult of Filial Li. Both Li and many of his backers were members of the Morality Society, another organization that, like the Red Swastika Society, maintained strong ties to figures within the Manchukuo government. The history of the two teachings is similar, as well. The Morality Society was already well established in the northeast before the formation of Manchukuo, and eventually came to operate as a separate organization, forming a branch organization in Xinjing late in 1935, receiving government approval of its activities, and changing
its name to the Manchukuo Morality Society soon thereafter. In 1937, it initiated a campaign to extend into the countryside. Older residents in Yinmahe confirmed that most nearby towns and villages did maintain a chapter of the organization, each consisting of a handful of wealthier families who would organize lectures on Confucian ethics. According to Shao Yong, the society actively encouraged its members to cooperate with Manchukuo authorities, a claim which seems likely considering the number of prominent Manchukuo political figures active in its leadership. The leaders of the national organization, Sun Qichang, Feng Hanqing, and Ruan Zhenduo, were all department-level ministers in the Manchukuo government. As was the case with the Red Swastika Society, Japanese authorities were largely absent from the active membership of the Morality Society, although they appeared to view it as harmless, even beneficial to the larger program of social transformation the government hoped to enact.

For the Chinese officials who supported Filial Li’s vigil, a commercial incentive is somewhat more apparent than it had been in the tomb of Filial Wang. With its constant supply of pilgrims, the tomb of Filial Li promised significant financial returns. Moreover, Sun Qichang, one of the most visible backers, had been involved in the lucrative field of temple administration earlier. Before the founding of Manchukuo, Sun had apparently promoted a miracle-working Daoist in his native Liaoyang and within a few months raised enough money to rebuild the local Guandi temple, and presumably made a tidy profit for himself.
Powerful forces within the Manchukuo government did encourage the popular veneration of Filial Li. The extent of high-level support for the cult was fully in evidence on the day that he emerged from his three years of mourning. This is the event described in this paper’s opening paragraph, and was marked by a formal Confucian ceremony, in which Li Zhongsan, wearing the long robes of a scholar, and flanked by Sun Qichang and Feng Hanqing, mounted a specially prepared stage and addressed the waiting crowd on the virtues of filial piety. Though no doubt more interested in miracles than lectures, roughly two thousand came to witness the spectacle. One source suggests, not implausibly, that the miracles themselves, and even Li’s connection to the deceased teacher were all staged by agents within the Manchukuo government.37

Yet, upon closer inspection, the claim that the tomb of Filial Li was simply a creation of the Manchukuo government does not quite hold up. Despite the support of influential Chinese members of the Morality Society, both the Manchukuo state as a whole, and the stratum of Japanese officials at its core, remained cool to all that was taking place in Rongjia wanzi. In addition to Sun Qichang and Feng Hanqing, other Chinese of note, such as the mayor of Jiutai, as well as police officials and local elites, all made an appearance at the ceremony marking the end of Li’s vigil, yet no mention is made of any Japanese officials having been in attendance.38 None of the interviewees in Rongjia wanzi or neighboring Yinmahe associated the tomb with Japan, nor had they ever seen any Japanese visit the site.39 Certain types of institutional support were also notably lacking. One account claimed that official media spread news of miracles at the site: making announcements on the trains to Jiutai and publishing articles in the Manchukuo press. Yet the Japanese-controlled Shengjing Times (Shengjing shibao 盛京時報), which was by this point the largest circulation Chinese-language daily, made no reference at all to Filial Li or his vigil during the weeks before or after the momentous day it was to be completed. Admittedly, this event came at a time when the invasion of the Chinese heartland was well underway, so daily reportage consisted largely of news of the Japanese capture of Wuhan 武漢. However, during the same weeks that the Shengjing Times neglected to publicize items related to the cult of Filial Li, it ran a number of articles on the far more mundane Autumn Confucian sacrifices being performed by local officials in various mid-sized locations. Even the Xinjing-based Unification Daily (Datong shibao 大同新聞) ignored the two filial tombs completely during the month of March 1937, despite publishing articles on state-sponsored Confucian rituals and lectures on an almost daily basis during this time.40 In other words, not only did Manchukuo state media not actively promote the cult of Filial Li, it seems that they specifically went out of their way to avoid publicizing its single most dramatic moment.41

39 Again, this is in contrast to the very visible role that Japanese officials played in other rituals. There was no Japanese troop presence in Yinmahe, although Japanese from Xinjing did occasionally visit the area on hunting expeditions. Interviews: Yinmahe and Lujia cun, Jilin, 26 December 2007.
40 I was able to gain access to only a single month of this publication. The tone and content are very similar to the Shengjing Times. Datong shibao [Unification Daily], March 1937.
41 Shengjing shibao [Shengjing Times], October 1938.
Moreover, although Li Zhongsan and his backers in the Morality Society both proved highly adept at manipulating the magical and financial power of the filial tomb, I believe that the initiative for the vigil came largely, or completely, from Li himself. The cult that developed around Filial Li was inspired by the famous grave of Filial Wang, with the obvious difference that it was based around a living filial son. This change was not necessarily a disadvantage, and was in some ways an improvement. The centuries-old association between extreme filial piety and miraculous power was equally viable pre- and post-mortem, and basing the site on a living filial son created an additional drawcard for pilgrims. However, the person who benefited the most from the change was obviously Li Zhongsan himself. Had the tomb been nothing more than a propaganda and commercial stunt, as has been claimed, planners would have found it much easier to work with an existing gravesite. Moreover, the tomb of Filial Li presents one obvious problem from a commercial perspective: it is remote. Rongjia wanzi is roughly eighteen kilometers away from Jiutai, and well over twice that distance from the capital. Even with the morning train stopping in Yinmahe, the location is not convenient to either city. One older resident of Rongjia wanzi described long lines of private cars lined up on the dirt road leading up to the tomb, a backhanded testament to the inaccessibility of the site. Had the grave’s siting been simply an attempt to franchise the tomb of Filial Wang, it would logically have been placed in a location more convenient to pilgrims. Taken together, such inconsistencies suggest that Li himself, perhaps with a small group of local supporters, took up the vigil independently, with higher level actors such as Sun Qichang acting in response.

Despite their differences, the cults of Filial Wang and Filial Li reveal the same network of interests at work in the administration and practice of religion in Manchukuo. Although supporters had portrayed the two filial sons as the pinnacle of Confucian respectability, the Manchukuo state never officially endorsed either tomb in a manner approaching its own official temples, simply because it did not consider the vigils or their cults to be proper religion. In his 1988 account of the tomb of Filial Li, Wang Zhuanye asked rhetorically “how the scientific Japanese could have supported such superstitious nonsense?” He was actually quite right. Manchukuo state documents and official media reveal an overwhelming concern among the Japanese architects of Manchukuo for the spiritual and transformative potential of religion, Confucianism in particular, and conversely, a tangible distaste for the ecstatic and miraculous. It is no surprise then, to see Japanese officials being conspicuously uninterested in the tomb of Filial Wang, and even less supportive of Filial Li. In contrast, the support that the two tombs received from members of the Chinese elite such as Zheng Xiaoxu 鄭孝胥 (1860–1938) or Sun Qichang has less to do with the civilizational aims of the Manchukuo government than the private religious and
commercial initiatives of the Red Swastika and Morality Societies. Finally, in terms of popular devotion, both sites became known for miracles, and especially for healing. As mentioned earlier, this theme is integral to grave-side piety in general, and would similarly characterize the new generation of tombs that would develop in the late 1940s. Even if the filial tombs did receive the backing of Manchukuo elites, it was the pervasiveness of this cultural idiom that allowed the cult to develop a following.

The Republic and After

Perhaps owing to their equivocal relationship with the Manchukuo government, each of these tombs easily weathered the fall of the state in 1945, and both continued to thrive under the Guomindang 國民黨, and even briefly under the Communist regime that followed. After the Japanese surrender, Guomindang forces arrived in Manchuria, and there briefly re-established a semblance of local administrative control. During this period, both the tombs and the votive practices they inspired continued to evolve. Thanks to the entrepreneurial spirit of Filial Li, the tomb in Rongjia wanzi expanded from a simple grave into a full-blown temple, while elsewhere, new filial sons took up vigils of their own. All of these sites, even those that had been associated with Manchukuo officialdom, continued to enjoy a limited degree of prosperity lasting into the early years of the People’s Republic, ending only during the mass campaigns of the late 1950s.

The tombs of Filial Wang and Filial Li thrived under the brief stewardship of the Guomindang. The transition between regimes was, at least for these sites, surprisingly smooth. Late in 1945, when the Daoists at the grave of Filial Wang held their annual ritual, the only apparent change was that banners that had once supported Manchukuo–Japan friendship now professed loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek. Similarly, the tomb of Filial Li continued to enjoy high official patronage under the new regime. Despite having had friendly ties to his erstwhile Manchukuo patrons, Li quickly won over the new Guomindang county authorities, particularly the Magistrate Qiao Shufen 喬樹芬 and Secretary Hu Daozheng 胡道生. From these, Li won permission to expand the gravesite with a complex of permanent buildings, which he grandiosely named the Temple of Filial Power (Xiaoling si 孝靈寺). More than just granting permission, the Guomindang county government also donated building materials, or at least so claimed Filial Li when he appeared one morning at a bridge construction site demanding a donation of six large timbers for the temple.

The following year, a large ceremony was held to formally inaugurate the temple. Although there is no record of Guomindang officials having been in attendance, a good ten thousand others were, with Filial Li presid-
MANCHUKUO’S FILIAL SONS

ing over the affair, and entertaining dignitaries in grand style. The temple itself was an ostentatious three-room building, with a pagoda near the grave. The political nature of the temple is evident in the main hall, where the central deities were arranged in three tiers. At the peak was the tablet of the High Emperor (that is, Yellow Emperor Xuanyuan huangdi), below which was a tablet for Sun Yat-sen, and finally, one proclaiming “Long Live the Republic!”. The theme of political orthodoxy extended to the Eastern Hall, which contained marble statues of Confucius and his four major students, along with tablets of another 72 minor disciples. This hall also contained tablets of three generations of Li ancestors and four plaques bearing names of Morality Society donors.

After the founding of the People’s Republic, both sites entered a slow decline. In 1951, Jiao Yingtang returned as an adult to his old orphanage, and was saddened to learn that the old Daoists who had lived nearby had all left. Most were rumored to have returned to the Qianshan wuliang guan in Liaoning, where Wang Mengxing himself was supposed to have once lived. The head Daoist, Chen Zhisheng (alternately given as Chen Shengsheng), was apparently not so lucky—Jiao saw him reduced to selling melon seeds on the streets of Changchun and, in June of the following year, the priest was arrested in the wake of a nationwide movement to “suppress counter-revolutionaries” (zhenya fangeming). Yet as late as 1957, locals continued to visit the tomb for its healing power. As a result, the tomb was finally demolished by the government the following year. In a similar manner, the tomb of Filial Li was “placed under the control of the masses”. Things went badly for Filial Li himself, who had not been wise enough to take flight, and was “struggled” by the Songjiang Armed Work Team (Songjiang wugong dui). Nothing further is known of his fate.

Despite the decline of the tomb sites, the cult of filial tombs continued to expand throughout the late 1940s. Local historian Zhang Yingchun describes three new tombs founded in Liao yuan (now in Jilin, but at the time it was part of Fengtian province) during these turbulent years. Like the tomb of Filial Li, each of these new sites was inspired by the famous tomb in Changchun, but also reveals individual eccentricities.

During the final months of the Manchukuo regime, Ma Qingshan visited Xinjing, and returned to his home of Xi’an county (now Xi’an district of Liao yuan county) carrying with him a photograph of the grave of Filial Wang. When his own mother died in February of 1945, in the final months of the Manchukuo regime, 33-year-old Ma followed Wang’s example and remained in a three-year vigil that outlasted the brief period of Guomindang rule, ending only after the area had already come under Communist control. The grave itself was located in his family village of Daliang tun, where Ma was able to count on the kindness of

---

44 Jiao Yingtang, “Changchun xiaozi fen,” pp.308–309. For the effect of this movement on religious groups, see Du Bois, Sacred Village, pp.141–47.
relations to supply him with food and a small hut. During his vigil, Filial Ma came to resemble what was now a recognizable pattern for filial sons. Three times each day, Ma mourning performed rituals for his mother, using grass for incense and wood for candles, and never speaking, except to bewail his own lack of propriety. During this time, Ma became known, not surprisingly, as a healer. In May of 1947, the area was taken by the Communists who, after some discussion of whether the custom was too superstitious to permit, decided to allow Ma to complete the vigil, which he did in February of 1948.

Yang Zemin 陽澤民, also from Xi'an City, began his vigil for his mother in his home village of Huapi tun 榮皮屯 in August of 1946. Yang's father had been a minor official under the Manchukuo regime, and as the regime deteriorated, so too did the family's meager fortunes. By the time Manchukuo fell, the family was in abject poverty, selling personal effects to survive, and weathering the various epidemics that swept through Manchuria. Yang's father died just before the fall of Manchukuo, his mother not long after, and it was at her grave that 33-year-old Yang set up his mourning vigil. At first, Yang's family did not accept his undertaking, but after seeing his resolve to remain at the grave, they came to support him, his two older sisters supplying him with the basic necessities of sustenance. Like Ma, Filial Yang began to study medicine and practice the various spiritual arts known collectively as gongfu (功夫), and became known as a healer, attracting patients from far and wide. Somewhat atypically, when his three years of mourning were completed, Yang remained at the grave for an additional eighteen months, only returning to society in January of 1951.

The third was Qin Chongshan 秦崇山, a peasant from Fusheng tun 福盛屯, who began mourning for his father and mother in April of 1947. As we might expect, Filial Qin spent the three years of his vigil studying and practicing medicine, gaining fame for his detailed theory of the five elements and five organs, and accepting payment only in the paper and incense he required to continue his mourning rituals. Unlike the other cases mentioned thus far, Qin was not located near a village, but rather on a mountain, where he was able to subsist on wild plants. Even after his three years had passed, Qin remained on the mountain, and would not leave until well over a decade later, at which point he was forcibly removed by a group of Red Guards.46

The sudden burst of interest in filial vigils in Liaoyuan illustrates with unusual clarity the spread of the custom into a new area. Ma Qingshan, the first of Liaoyuan's filial sons, was clearly affected by his visit to the tomb of Filial Wang, and in turn inspired two more vigils in nearby communities. Yet unlike the earlier tombs, these Liaoyuan vigils did not have the support of government officials or of organized religious societies. The fact that

---

all five sites developed such remarkably similar cults, most notably the association with healing, has less to do with planning or direction than the fact that all developed out of the same cultural context.

*A Tomb to Remember*

Half a century later, today’s residents of Changchun differ widely in their memory of the tomb of Filial Wang. While many remember the site in detail, a surprising number who had lived in Changchun during the 1940s have no knowledge of the tomb whatsoever. This is likely to change with the construction of the Chinese Filial Virtue Culture Park which will feature a reconstruction of the original Filial Tomb. While this particular plan is a product of the tourist authority in Changchun, it fits with a more broad desire of Chinese authorities to promote Confucianism as China’s unique cultural export. Nationally, this initiative includes a massive expansion of the temple complexes at Confucius’s birthplace at Qufu 曲阜, while in Changchun it is reflected most clearly in the Confucian temple, which was rebuilt in 2002, and is slated for expansion into a neighboring lot.47

This enthusiasm for Confucianism extended to Wang Mengxing’s original Filial Tomb, as well. Early in 2005, the mayor of Changchun, Zhang Chunren 張純仁 raised the idea of rebuilding the tomb, and in April of that year the Changchun Department of Tourism proposed the plan publicly. That December, folklorist Shi Lixue 施立信 proposed the construction of a Chinese Filial Virtue Culture Park, and it was decided to combine the two into a single project. Designs were drawn up for the Chinese Filial Virtue Culture Park to feature two halls and three pavilions, containing statues and carvings of texts such as the *Classic of Filial Piety* (Xiaojing 孝經). The Filial Tomb, reconstructed from old photographs to look exactly like the original, would stand at the center.

This plan did not please everyone. Shi felt that the tomb should be included, but not as a focal point. He agreed that Wang’s actions were unquestionably laudable, and that the tomb should be retained for its value as a tourist attraction. However, placing the tomb at the center of the complex risked legitimating the unhealthy, conservative side of Confucianism, rather than the social responsibility, family values and civic mindedness of modern Confucianism. Liu Guoping 劉國平, a folklorist with the Jilin Provincial Academy of Social Sciences (Jilin sbebi kexue yuan 吉林社會科學院), argued the point more forcefully, saying that the tomb should not be included at all. For Liu, the Filial Tomb represented nothing more than “mindless loyalty and idiotic piety” (yu zhi yu xiao 愚忠愚孝). The reason was clear: in a modern socialist society, Confucianism should mean respect, love and care for the aged, and nothing more.48

---


Conclusion

The spread of filial tombs attests to the intensity and diversity of interest in religion during the brief existence of Manchukuo. Overall, the state was the single most important actor. Manchukuo itself was predicated upon a Confucian revival, and placed great confidence in its ability to transform religious institutions and engineer a new spiritual subject. Similar programs had already been attempted elsewhere in East Asia, with the creation of state Shinto in Japan, and government-led campaigns such as the New Life Movement in China, and characterized policy in other Japanese possessions such as Korea and Taiwan. But nowhere was the impulse to spiritual engineering stronger or more ambitious than in Manchukuo.

However, filial tombs were not part of this state-led transformation, and the story of their spread attests to the influence of other actors in the formation of religious culture. Clearly, the cult of filial tombs was quite unlike the tightly choreographed Confucianism promoted by the state. Whereas state Confucianism was staid and moralistic, the tombs were sites of miraculous cures and emotional exuberance, a type of religion that is dangerously unpredictable, and generally unwelcome to the forces of orthodoxy. This reaction is not unique to Manchukuo, or even to Asia. In modern Europe, expanding states and the Catholic Church often proved the staunchest opponents of miracle cults, stepping in to crush such movements before they could take root. Of course, European miracle cults also had their champions as well, not merely the faithful, but also local merchants, semi-state actors and religious entrepreneurs who realized the vast power of a sacred site to generate blessings, fame and income. A similar difference in interests and perspectives explains why Japanese representatives of the Manchukuo state remained cool to the cult of filial tombs, while so many within the second tier of Chinese officials actively and publicly embraced it. Somewhat ironically, the resurgence of official support for Confucianism in China since the 1990s in many ways mirrors the perspective and concerns expressed in Manchukuo, particularly in its desire to define the tradition purely in terms of its integrative philosophical and cultural aspects.

In the end, filial vigils were fundamentally acts of individual initiative and piety, and developed out of a culture that would be ready to receive them. Although the forces of orthodoxy in Manchukuo would have found much about the filial tombs singularly distasteful, their own promotion of Confucianism and implicit recognition of Wang Mengxing’s tomb did much to provide the ideological foundation for a new generation of filial sons. Yet it did not create them. The continued evolution and spontaneous generation of new tombs after the fall of Manchukuo demonstrates the limited influence of the state or religious groups over the tombs or the votive practices that they inspired. Even with the ground so thoroughly

---

prepared for the cults to take root, events could only be set in motion by an individual who was ready to take up a vigil of his own. This initiative, I believe, can never be completely controlled by even the most ambitious program of spiritual engineering.

The current generation of leadership in Changchun may someday find themselves facing a similar problem in their attempt to maintain control over the memory of the filial tombs. It is worth remembering that another Jilin native, Li Hongzhi 李洪志 (1951–), developed his Falun Gong out of a craze for qigong 氣功 that was encouraged by the Chinese government during the 1990s. Much as they would desire to dictate the ideas and feelings that the new Filial Tomb at the Chinese Filial Virtue Culture Park, this realm will ultimately remain beyond the ability of the state, or anyone else to control.

Figure 12
The newly reconstructed Confucian Temple in Changchun.
Photograph by author

Thomas David Dubois
Department of History
National University of Singapore
histdd@nus.edu.sg